Unusual auctions for particular goods/services in which participants continue to contribute some amount in every round, until all but one person drops out. The last person to drop out wins the thing being auctioned.

Alternative tool name:

Tool variation:

Category: Incentives/gifts

Sub-category: Direct incentive

Relevant theories: Auction theory

Type of evidence: Field-exp-charity

Evidence strength (ad hoc assessment):

Main findings

Standard charity auctions don't clearly raise much more than the value of the goods. All-pay auctions work well in theory and in the lab, but other methods (“VCMs”, lotteries) work better in the field (Onderstal et al).


Practical relevance

Use cases


Very common (APA rare)

Key papers

Secondary papers

Contributors David Reinstein

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  • Last modified: 2018/08/02 21:58
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