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tables:tools [2019/02/27 12:25]
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tables:tools [2019/02/27 14:28]
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 | [[tools:​Influence others|Influence others]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | (Tell) donors that their donations will be reported to other potential future donors. ​ This may motivate them to get more in order to set an example and positively influence later donors. | Mixed, but still underpowered evidence (of desire for lead contributors to give more to influence others) | [[papers:​Reputation And Influence In Charitable Giving An Experiment|(Reinstein & R, '​11)b]],​ [[papers:​Hey Look At Me The Effect Of Giving Circles On Giving|(Karlan & M, '14)]] | | [[tools:​Influence others|Influence others]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | (Tell) donors that their donations will be reported to other potential future donors. ​ This may motivate them to get more in order to set an example and positively influence later donors. | Mixed, but still underpowered evidence (of desire for lead contributors to give more to influence others) | [[papers:​Reputation And Influence In Charitable Giving An Experiment|(Reinstein & R, '​11)b]],​ [[papers:​Hey Look At Me The Effect Of Giving Circles On Giving|(Karlan & M, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Give if you win|Give if you win]] | <popover content="​When do you ask for donations and commitments?​ From what sources of income (regular income, bonuses, tax refunds...)?​ Do you ask for commitments that are *conditional* on certain outcomes? When will the pledged donations actually be made, and with what pattern over time?" trigger='​hover'>​Timing/​conditionality,​ income source</​popover>​ | Ask for *conditional* commitments from uncertain unrealized income. E.g., ask "if you get a raise next year, would you donate 10%  of your salary increase?" ​ This can be a nonbinding pledge you're reminded of, or a more formal commitment. (See giveifyouwin.org.) | People facing uncertain gains donate more if asked to donate in advance, conditionally on positive outcome. Also, people who have just failed to win a bonus are particularly unlikely to donate (relative to winners or relative to those with no possibility of a gain). | [[papers:​Commitments To Give If You Win Exceed Donations After A Win |(Kellner ea, '17)]] | | [[tools:​Give if you win|Give if you win]] | <popover content="​When do you ask for donations and commitments?​ From what sources of income (regular income, bonuses, tax refunds...)?​ Do you ask for commitments that are *conditional* on certain outcomes? When will the pledged donations actually be made, and with what pattern over time?" trigger='​hover'>​Timing/​conditionality,​ income source</​popover>​ | Ask for *conditional* commitments from uncertain unrealized income. E.g., ask "if you get a raise next year, would you donate 10%  of your salary increase?" ​ This can be a nonbinding pledge you're reminded of, or a more formal commitment. (See giveifyouwin.org.) | People facing uncertain gains donate more if asked to donate in advance, conditionally on positive outcome. Also, people who have just failed to win a bonus are particularly unlikely to donate (relative to winners or relative to those with no possibility of a gain). | [[papers:​Commitments To Give If You Win Exceed Donations After A Win |(Kellner ea, '17)]] |
-| [[tools:​Precover overhead costs|Pre-cover overhead costs]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | A third party (large donor, organization,​ etc) may agree that they will pay all of the "​overhead costs" for a charity or project. ​ Later potential donors ​ can then be told that the full amount of their gift will go towards "​program activities"​. (However, defining "​overhead" ​ is tricky.) | Using a lead donor funds to "cover overhead"​ increases donation incidence and amounts; more effective than match or seed. | [[papers:​Avoiding Overhead Aversion In Charity|(Gneezy ea, '14)]], [[papers:​Are Overhead Costs A Good Guide For Charitable Giving|(Meer,​ '17)]] |+| [[tools:​Precover overhead costs|Pre-cover overhead costs]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | A third party (large donor, organization,​ etc) may agree that they will pay all of the "​overhead costs" for a charity or project. ​ Later potential donors ​ can then be told that the full amount of their gift will go towards "​program activities"​. (However, defining "​overhead" ​ is tricky.) | Using a lead donor funds to "cover overhead"​ increases donation incidence and amounts; more effective than match or seed. | [[papers:​Avoiding Overhead Aversion In Charity|(Gneezy ea, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Charities collaboratecompete|Charities collaborate/​compete?​]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | When people get appeals for one charity, and respond by donating, ​ this may make them less likely to donate to other charities. If charities are thus in competition,​ but they share similar ultimate goals, they may do better in net by limiting and coordinating their fundraising activities. | Mixed evidence on whether a charitable ask or incentive for one charity reduces donations to other charities. Estimates range from zero to complete crowding-out. For similar charities?, esp for larger givers;? for  those offered matches; for repeated asks.  Specific appeals/​tools have been found to increase *overall* giving (and not be completely crowded out). In other studies a complete '​time-shifting'​ effect cannot be ruled out, but these are often underpowered. | [[papers:Do Charities Get More When They Ask More Often Evidence From A Unique Field Experiment|(Donkers ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does Irritation Induced By Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations|(Diepen ea, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Lift And Shift The Effect Of Fundraising Interventions In Charity Space And Time|(Scharf ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does One Charitable Contribution Come At The Expense Of Another|(Reinstein,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:​Does Fundraising Create New Giving|(Meer,​ '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Demand For Giving To Multiple Charities An Experimental Study|(Filiz-Ozbay & U, '​18)]],​ [[papers:​Substitution Effects Across Charitable Donations|(Cairns & S, '11)]] | | [[tools:​Charities collaboratecompete|Charities collaborate/​compete?​]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | When people get appeals for one charity, and respond by donating, ​ this may make them less likely to donate to other charities. If charities are thus in competition,​ but they share similar ultimate goals, they may do better in net by limiting and coordinating their fundraising activities. | Mixed evidence on whether a charitable ask or incentive for one charity reduces donations to other charities. Estimates range from zero to complete crowding-out. For similar charities?, esp for larger givers;? for  those offered matches; for repeated asks.  Specific appeals/​tools have been found to increase *overall* giving (and not be completely crowded out). In other studies a complete '​time-shifting'​ effect cannot be ruled out, but these are often underpowered. | [[papers:Do Charities Get More When They Ask More Often Evidence From A Unique Field Experiment|(Donkers ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does Irritation Induced By Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations|(Diepen ea, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Lift And Shift The Effect Of Fundraising Interventions In Charity Space And Time|(Scharf ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does One Charitable Contribution Come At The Expense Of Another|(Reinstein,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:​Does Fundraising Create New Giving|(Meer,​ '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Demand For Giving To Multiple Charities An Experimental Study|(Filiz-Ozbay & U, '​18)]],​ [[papers:​Substitution Effects Across Charitable Donations|(Cairns & S, '11)]] |
 | [[tools:​Askerdonor connection|Asker-donor connection]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Fundraisers ​ could choose solicitors who have a particular connection with potential donors (e.g., from  same university or geographic area), ​ and emphasize this connection. | "When a college roommate calls to ask for a donation to the alma mater, both the likelihood and amount of giving rise significantly."​ | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '11)]] | | [[tools:​Askerdonor connection|Asker-donor connection]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Fundraisers ​ could choose solicitors who have a particular connection with potential donors (e.g., from  same university or geographic area), ​ and emphasize this connection. | "When a college roommate calls to ask for a donation to the alma mater, both the likelihood and amount of giving rise significantly."​ | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '11)]] |
  • tables/tools.txt
  • Last modified: 2019/03/16 23:00
  • by katja