Academic papers relevant to giving/fundraising (Click links to open page)

ReferenceTitleType of evidenceDiscussionToolsLink
(Moore ea, '73)Affect And Altruism.
(Yörük, '15)Charity RatingsCausal-observational (IV etc) Quality ratings
(Brown & F, '02)Philanthropy And Social Capital In Los Angeles
(Kamas & P, '10)What Can Social Preferences Tell Us About Charitable Giving? Evidence On Responses To Price Of Giving, Matching, And Rebates
(Konow, '10)Mixed Feelings: Theories Of And Evidence On Giving
(Diamond & I, '07)Creating Effective Direct Mail Charitable Solicitations: The Effects Of Enclosures And Different Appeals
(Fraser & H, '89)The Effect Of Matching Contribution Offers And Legitimization Of Paltry Contributions On ComplianceField-exp-charityAbstract
> The use of a matching contribution offer in conjunction with legitimization of paltry contributions is examined in a door-to-door charitable solicitation context. Three hundred and twenty households were exposed to charitable contribution requests employing either legitimization of paltry contributions, a matching contribution offer, both, or a control. It was predicted that the matching funds offer, paired with legitimization of paltry donations, would increase both compliance rates and donation sizes and generate greater revenues than either tactic used singly. The results of a field experiment support this prediction.
Ask for *small* donationFull text
(Yörük, '09)How Responsive Are Charitable Donors To Requests To Give? Personal ask
(Gneezy ea, '17)Do I Care If You Are Paid? A Field Experiment On Charitable DonationsField-exp-charity Solicitor characteristicsFull text
(Desmet & F, '03)Ask And Ye Shall Receive: The Effect Of The Appeals Scale On Consumers' Donation Behavior
(Chang & L, '09)Framing Charity Advertising: Influences Of Message Framing, Image Valence, And Temporal Framing On A Charitable Appeal1Hypothetical/intentional experiment Negative/positive framingFull text
(Andreoni, '98)Toward A Theory Of Charitable Fund-Raising
(Carpenter ea, '07)Charity Auctions: A Field Experimentast (All-pay) Auctions
(Peacey ea, '14)Masked Heroes: Endogenous Anonymity In Charitable Giving Full text
(Sanders, '17)Social Influences On Charitable Giving In The WorkplaceField-exp-charity PersonalisationFull text
(Sudhir ea, '16)Do Sympathy Biases Induce Charitable Giving? The Effects Of Advertising Content Individual/identifiable victim, Negative/positive framingFull text
(Bilodeau & S, '97)Rival Charities
(Reinstein & R, '11)bReputation And Influence In Charitable Giving: An Experiment Revelation - gender mediator, Visibility/publicity
(Harbaugh ea, '07)Neural Responses To Taxation And Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives For Charitable Donations
(Smith, '15)On The Equivalence Of Giving Using The Sequential And Strategy Methods
(Small & L, '03)Helping A Victim Or Helping The Victim: Altruism And IdentifiabilityCorrelational-observational, Hypothetical/intentional experiment, Causal-observational (IV etc) Individual/identifiable victimFull text
(Vesterlund, '03)The Informational Value Of Sequential Fundraising This paper examines a puzzling inconsistency between the theoretical prediction of
private provisions to public goods and actual fundraising behavior. While fundraisers often
choose to announce past contributions, economic theory predicts that contributions will be
largest when donors are uninformed of the contributions made by others. This paper
suggests that an announcement strategy may be optimal because it helps reveal the charity’s
quality. It is shown that when there is imperfect information about the value of the public
good and contributors can purchase information regarding its quality, then there exist
equilibria in which an announcement strategy is optimal. Interestingly, in equilibrium a
high-quality charity receives contributions that exceed those that would result had the
quality of the charity been common knowledge. Hence, an announcement strategy not only
helps worthwhile organizations reveal their type, but it also helps the fundraiser reduce the
free-rider problem.
Quality ratingsFull text
(Tonin & V, '17)Sharing One'S Fortune? An Experimental Study On Earned Income And Giving
(Yörük, '14)Does Giving To Charity Lead To Better Health? Evidence From Tax Subsidies For Charitable Giving Full text
(Carpenter ea, '06)They Come To Play: Supply Effects In An Economic Experiment
(Bolton ea, '98)Dictator Game Giving: Rules Of Fairness Versus Acts Of Kindness
(Iwaarden ea, '09)Charities: How Important Is Performance To Donors?Hypothetical survey“effectiveness is seen as important, but not as the major criterion in the selection of a charity. Charities do not have standardized reporting systems to inform donors on their performances”"Impact" (per $) info
(Okunade, '96)Graduate School Alumni Donations To Academic Funds: Micro-Data Evidence Full text
(Falk, '07)Gift Exchange In The FieldField-exp-charity Unconditional giftFull text
(Anik ea, '14)Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations In spite of title, the results seem mixed/underpowered perhaps?Contingent matchFull text
(Biddle & H, '89)Sleep And The Allocation Of Time Full text
(Tonin & V, '13)An Experimental Investigation Of Intrinsic Motivations For Giving
(Eckel & G, '08)aSubsidizing Charitable Contributions: A Natural Field Experiment Comparing Matching And Rebate SubsidiesField-exp-charity "Matching" (vs rebates)
(Chuan & S, '13)'Feel The Warmth' Glow: A Field Experiment On Manipulating The Act Of Giving Ideas42:
> In a door-to-door fundraising campaign (n = 1,536), volunteers asked households to support a local charity that provides blankets to families in need. Solicitors explained that holiday cards would accompany the blankets funded by donors. They told the control group that cards had been pre-written, but gave the treatment group the option of writing messages. Contrary to the researchers’ hypothesis, households in the treatment group were 20% less likely to donate. They conclude that the opportunity to write a card may drive up the cost of giving in multiple ways: 1) more social pressure to accompany the personal gesture with a larger gift amount, 2) increased time to complete a transaction, and/or 3) additional need to make two decisions – whether to give, and whether to write a card – rather than one (Chuan and Samak 2013).
Reduce transaction costs
(Loewenstein, '87)Anticipation And The Valuation Of Delayed Consumption
(Bernheim, '94)A Theory Of Conformity
(Broberg ea, '07)Is Generosity Involuntary?
(Cooper ea, '96)Cooperation Without Reputation: Experimental Evidence From Prisoner'S Dilemma Games
(Feldstein & T, '76)The Income Tax And Charitable ContributionsCausal-observational (IV etc)Claims causality, if I recall correctly, but identification is difficult Full text
(Lange & S, '12)The Complementarities Of Competition In Charitable Fundraising
(Tallontire ea, '01)Ethical Consumers And Ethical Trade: A Review Of Current Literature.
(List & S, '98)The Deadweight Loss Of Christmas: Comment
(Small ea, '07)bSympathy And Callousness: The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims Study 1: Explicit debiasing (teaching about the ID victims effect) significantly reduced giving to identifiable victims, and find significant difference from the effect on giving to statistical victims. (Latter effect positive, insignificant; bounds?)

Study 2: Tests whether this is driven by more/less frame; but is this test powerful enough?

Further results on emotional mediators/channels
Effectiveness info: deliberation
(Dohmen ea, '11)The Intergenerational Transmission Of Risk And Trust Attitudes
(Heckman & P, '13)Econometric Mediation Analyses: Identifying The Sources Of Treatment Effects From Experimentally Estimated Production Technologies With Unmeasured And Mismeasured Inputs
(Grant & B, '18)
(Lee & F, '16)The Identifiable Victim Effect: A Meta-Analytic ReviewMeta-analysis/lit surveyAbstract:
> A random-effects meta-analysis … overall weighted effect of IVE. … 41 studies… Results … overall significant yet modest IVE (r = .05). … IVE appears reliable mainly when there is a single identified or a single unidentified victim, and/or when study characteristics include elements of the following: a photographed child suffering from poverty, bearing little responsibility for the need, and/or associated with monetary requests….
(Eckel & G, '03)Rebate Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?Lab-charity "Matching" (vs rebates)Full text
(Talbot, '97)Where Does Your Coffee Dollar Go?: The Division Of Income And Surplus Along The Coffee Commodity Chain
(Okunade ea, '94)Charitable Giving Of Alumni Full text
(Andreoni ea, '17)Avoiding The Ask: A Field Experiment On Altruism, Empathy, And Charitable GivingField-exp-charityIdeas42:
> In a randomized natural field experiment (n = 8,831), Salvation Army solicitors were stationed sometimes at one and sometimes at both of two main entrances to a supermarket. This gave some shoppers an easy way to avoid requests to donate. Solicitors were either silent and simply rang a bell as shoppers passed or made eye contact and asked shoppers to “please give today”. Researchers found that verbally asking people to give dramatically raised participation rates and increased the total amount donated by more than 50%. However, the direct ask also led a third of shoppers to avoid solicitors altogether by using other entrances. Evidence suggests that “avoiders” are shielding themselves from emotion-based impulses to give and the guilt associated with not giving, revealing a sophisticated understanding of empathy and altruism rather than callousness or selfishness
Info on recipients' deservingnessFull text
(Cowley ea, '11)The New State Of Donation: Three Decades Of Household Giving To Charity Full text
(Oliveira ea, '11)The Giving Type: Identifying DonorsLab-charityAbstract:
.>..We run an experiment using a non- student sample (an artefactual field experiment) in which participants have the opportunity to donate to multiple charitable organizations. … Our results support the existence of a giving type; a factor analysis demonstrates that giving decisions are driven by a single (unique) factor, and individuals who give to one organization, give significantly more to other organizations than do non-donors…

> participants have the opportunity to give to
multiple neighborhood charitable organizations, as well as to make donations in a standard public goods game… Donations are matched (doubled) to provide an incentive to give. The study targets a unique, understudied population in a historically low-income African-American neighborhood in Dallas, TX.

> participants were randomly assigned into independent and anonymous groups of three and given an endowment of $60 which they could either keep for themselves or donate. … participants were given four discrete options…. (1) keep all $60, (2) keep $40 and donate $20, (3) keep $20 and donate $40, or (4) donate all $60. … In the three donation tasks, money donated was doubled and then given to a neighborhood charity;
(Hsee ea, '13)Unit Asking: A Method To Boost Donations And Beyond Unit asking
(Eckel & G, '08)bEncouraging Giving: Subsidies In The Field Offer a matching donationFull text
(Bear ea, '17)Co-Evolution Of Cooperation And Cognition: The Impact Of Imperfect Deliberation And Context-Sensitive Intuition
(Cooter & B, '05)Charity, Publicity, And The Donation Registry
(Karlan & W, '17)The Effect Of Effectiveness: Donor Response To Aid Effectiveness In A Direct Mail Fundraising ExperimentField-exp-charityFirst wave treatment was an non-numerical indicator of the method's credibility:
> “According to studies on our programs in Peru that used rigorous scientific methodologies, women who have received both loans and business education saw their profits grow”; in first wave the strong emotional appeal was present for both control and treatment.

The second wave treatment was quantitative
> That is why we have coordinated with independent researchers [at Yale University] to conduct scientifically rigorous impact studies of our programs.In Peru they found that women who were offered our Credit with Education program had 16% higher profits in their businesses than those who were not, and they increased profits in bad months by 27%!

… and it also *removed* the emotional component (for the treatment, retained for the control).

They report the *net* effect of both treatments. A re-analysis of the raw data could be very helpful.

<airtable:mention id=“menk4OzwZMtIepN5z”>@Alexis Carlier</airtable:mention>
Effectiveness info: deliberation, "Impact" (per $) infoFull text
(Haynes ea, '12)Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy With Randomised Controlled TrialsCabinet Office
(Landry ea, '08)Is A Donor In Hand Better Than Two In The Bush? Evidence From A Natural Field ExperimentField-exp-charity Lotteries/rafflesFull text
(Arulampalam ea, '14)Unofficial Development Assistance: A Model Of Development Charities' Donation Income
(Lacetera & M, '10)Do All Material Incentives For Pro-Social Activities Backfire? The Response To Cash And Non-Cash Incentives For Blood Donations
(Long, '76)Social Pressure And Contributions To Health Charities
(Schokkaert & O, '00)Preference Variation And Private Donations
(Chao, '17)Demotivating Incentives And Motivation Crowding Out In Charitable GivingField-exp-charity Thank you notes/gifts, Gift for donorsFull text
(Martin & R, '08)How Is Donation Behaviour Affected By The Donations Of Others?Field-exp-charityPre-filled boxes with mix of coins. bills etc. Tracked contributions by visitors to gallery. Coins –> larger number of smaller contributions. Bills –> fewer, larger contributions.Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Alpizar ea, '08)Anonymity, Reciprocity, And Conformity: Evidence From Voluntary Contributions To A National Park In Costa RicaField-exp-charity Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Smith ea, '14)Peer Effects In Charitable Giving: Evidence From The (Running) FieldCausal-observational (IV etc) Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Cialdini ea, '73)Transgression And Altruism: A Case For Hedonism
(Ruffle & T, '00)The Deadweight Loss Of Christmas: Comment
(Katz & R, '05)An Economic Interpretation Of Institutional Volunteering
(Sugden, '82)On The Economics Of Philanthropy
(Clotfelter, '03)Alumni Giving To Elite Private Colleges And Universities Full text
(Micklewright & S, '07)Giving To Development: Who Gives To Overseas Causes?
(Kranton, '96)Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System
(Rotemberg, '02)Endogenous Altruism In Buyer-Seller Relations And Its Implications For Vertical Integration
(Güth ea, '02)The Coevolution Of Trust And Institutions In Anonymous And Non-Anonymous Communities
(Kogut & R, '17)Helping An Outgroup Member Or The Outgroup: The Identifiability Effect In An Intergroup Context Individual/identifiable victim
(Khanna ea, '95)Charity Donations In The Uk: New Evidence Based On Panel Data
(Bird & H, '97)Ethical Consumerism: The Case Of “Fairly-Traded” Coffee
(Rutherford, '10)Get By With A Little Help From My Friends: A Recent History Of Charitable Organisations In Economic Theory
(Köszegi, '06)Ego Utility, Overconfidence, And Task Choice
(Samek & S, '15)Selective Recognition: How To Recognize Donors To Increase Charitable GivingLab-charity
(Breman, '11)Give More Tomorrow: Two Field Experiments On Altruism And Intertemporal ChoiceField-exp-charity Give more tomorrowFull text
(Charness & G, '09)Incentives To Exercise
(Cooper ea, '94)Alternative Institutions For Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence On Forward Induction And Preplaycommunication
(Bénabou & T, '06)Incentives And Prosocial Behavior
(Arfer ea, '15)Reputational Concerns, Not Altruism, Motivate Restraint When Gambling With Other People'S Money
(Feldstein, '75)The Income Tax And Charitable Contributions: Part I—Aggregate And Distributional Effects
(Micklewright & W, '04)Private Donations For International Development
(Martin & R, '09)How Sunday, Price, And Social Norms Influence Donation Behaviour Offer a matching donation
(Andreoni ea, '03)Charitable Giving By Married Couples: Who Decides And Why Does It Matter? Full text
(Metzger & G, '15)Making An Impact? The Relevance Of Information On Aid Effectiveness For Charitable Giving. A Laboratory Experiment.Lab-charity> …the demand for information about aid impact is lowest, and it is highest for information about the recipient type

[Note: the latter would seem to also be a possible effectiveness measure!]

> … exact information about aid impact did not lead to a significant change in average donation levels, while information about the exact recipient type and administrative costs led to a significant change in donation levels.

> In the recipient type group, informed participants donated significantly more than uninformed participants because they “rewarded” the preferred recipient with higher-than-average transfers. In the administration costs group, informed participants donated significantly less than uninformed participants because they used the information to “punish” NGOs with high administration costs
"Impact" (per $) info
(List, '04)Young, Selfish And Male: Field Evidence Of Social Preferencesast
(Hugh-Jones & R, '10)The Benefit Of Anonymity In Public Goods Games
(Small & S, '07)Friends Of Victims: Personal Experience And Prosocial Behavior
(Auten & J, '96)Charitable Contributions And Intergenerational Transfers
(Phillips ea, '08)Do Humans Prefer Altruistic Mates? Testing A Link Between Sexual Selection And Altruism Towards Non-Relatives
(Goswami & U, '16)When Should The Ask Be A Nudge? The Effect Of Default Amounts On Charitable Donations Default/suggested contribution
(Kataria & R, '14)Honestly, Why Are You Donating Money To Charity? An Experimental Study About Self-Awareness In Status-Seeking Behavior
(Simpson & W, '08)Altruism And Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction Of Person And Situation In Prosocial Behavior
(Carman, '03)Social Influences And The Private Provision Of Public Goods: Evidence From Charitable Contributions In The Workplace
(Brosig, '02)Identifying Cooperative Behavior: Some Experimental Results In A Prisoner'S Dilemma Game
(Portillo & S, '18)Overhead Aversion: Do Some Types Of Overhead Matter More Than Others?Lab-charity“If an overhead-free donation is readily available, then the average donor in our experiment (70–80% of subjects) prefers that charity to receive the donation. However, if donations are not overhead-free, most (approximately two-thirds of subjects) prefer the donation go toward fundraising efforts instead of salary-related expenditures.”Pre-cover overhead costsFull text
(Harrison & J, '05)Identifying Altruism In The Laboratory
(Fosgaard & A, '18)Promises undone: How committed pledges impact donations to charityField-exp-charityAbstract
…Evidence shows that people who say they will give mostly do not follow through. Our theory shows that having people to formally state the intended amount may alleviate this problem. We report on a field experiment the results of which show that donors who have pledged an amount are indeed more likely to follow through. The firmer the pledge, the more closely the amount donated matches the amount that was pledged. 45% of all participants however refuses to pledge. …[demonstrating that some] donors value flexibility over commitment in intertemporal charitable giving.
Pledging/precommitmentFull text
(Khanna & S, '00)Partners In Giving:: The Crowding-In Effects Of Uk Government Grants
(Fisman ea, '05)Individual Preferences For Giving
(Brown & T, '15)Charitable Behaviour And The Big Five Personality Traits: Evidence From Uk Panel Data Full text
(Everett ea, '15)Doing Good By Doing Nothing? The Role Of Social Norms In Explaining Default Effects In Altruistic Contexts
(Jenni & L, '97)Explaining The Identifiable Victim Effect Provides support for the “reference group effect” (proportional dominance) as an explanation for the identifiable victims bias.
(Cueva & D, '10)Charitable Giving And Self-Signaling Full text
(Andreoni & P, '03)Do Government Grants To Private Charities Crowd Out Giving Or Fund-Raising?
(Potter & S, '08)Review Of Payroll Giving Full text
(Null, '11)Warm Glow, Information, And Inefficient Charitable GivingLab-charityWhy donors give to multiple charities is a bit of a puzzle; given most people's small contributions, the effectiveness of each charity is not likely to diminish in their contribution; thus one charity is likely to be the most effective. People may be exactly indifferent between these, perceiving them to yield the same marginal benefit. If this were the case, lowering the price (increasing the matching rate) for one of these charities should get them to shift all their donation to that charity. However, participants in this experiment shift the donations only somewhat in response to this, which could be attributed to a form of “risk aversion” over the charity's impact, or a version of “warm glow” (with a diminishing marginal warm glow in the amount given to each charity). Introducing exogenous risks over matching rates … roughly 2/3 of those that choose to shift only imperfectly are not measured to be “risk averse”.

Her experiments were run both at Kiwanis/Rotary clubs and with “professional subjects” (university administrators?) at the Berkeley X-lab; the former strictly involved allocations *among* charities, in the latter case what was not given away could be kept. For the main reported treatments, participants made a series of decisions under different incentives (mostly on the same pages and thus simultaneously?). The “prize” was $100; in each session only one decision from one subject was chosen.

Null includes an experiment on “donor control” in the same paper, which is fairly distinct (we will report this separately).

> … revealed preference data from a lab experiment in which more than 200 real-world donors decide how to divide a gift between a charity they currently support and a set of international development charities. Most subjects simultaneously give to multiple development charities that have similar mission statements. This is true even when the social benefit of gifts, proxied by the matching rates received by the charities, are not equal. … Subjects forfeited social surplus (matching funds) equal to 25% of the value of their gifts. … Few subjects were willing to pay for information that could have enabled them to increase the social benefit of their gifts.

> By exogenously varying the marginal social benefit of a gift and the risk associated with this marginal social benefit, my experimental design allows me to distinguish subjects who give to multiple charities because they are perfect substitutes from those who split their gifts ineficiently, and to identify the source of these ineficiencies as either being attributable to warm glow or risk aversion.

> When they were told the distribution of matching rates but not how the rates would be assigned to charities, only 40% of subjects were willing to give up a small portion of their endowments in order to nd out which charity would receive the highest rate; the rest preferred to allocate their gifts without knowing what they would be worth to the charities.
Give donor control
(Sargeant & W, '07)Gift Giving: An Interdisciplinary Review
(Diepen ea, '09)Does Irritation Induced By Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations?Field-exp-charity> Our analysis reveals that direct mailings do result in irritation, but surprisingly, this irritation affects neither stated nor actual donating behavior.Charities collaborate/competeFull text
(Galanter, '62)The Direct Measurement Of Utility And Subjective Probability Present small "base group", frame the problem as limited in scale
(Wilhelm, '06)New Data On Charitable Giving In The Psid
(Brown & S, '00)Household Decisions Regarding Charitable Gifts
(Donkers ea, '17)Do Charities Get More When They Ask More Often? Evidence From A Unique Field ExperimentField-exp-charityEvidence for “cannibalization” of own mailings, some competitive effect on other charities in the short run; underpowered to detect long-run competitive effectsCharities collaborate/compete
(Dyck & C, '92)Using Positive Vs. Negative Photographs For Third-World Fund RaisingField-exp-charity Negative/positive framingFull text
(Pelsmacker ea, '05)bConsumer Preferences For The Marketing Of Ethically Labelled Coffee
(Guala & F, '16)The Effect Of Group Identity On Distributive Choice: Social Preference Or Heuristic?
(Micklewright & S, '09)Who Gives Charitable Donations For Overseas Development?Correlational-observational
(Cox & D, '07)When Are Women More Generous Than Men?
(Huck ea, '15)Comparing Charitable Fundraising Schemes: Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment And A Structural Model
(Atkinson, '09)Giving Overseas And Public Policy
(Atkinson ea, '17)Charitable bequests and wealth at death Correlational-observationalOur main findings are the following:

- to understand giving to charitable causes, it is necessary to consider a multi-stage process:

leaving significant wealth at death, making a will, including a charitable bequest, the conditions under which a bequest materialises and the form in which it is made;

- the different stages in the decision process are influenced differently by the variables that we have considered: age, gender, and our particular focus, estate size;

- the proportion of decedents leaving significant wealth rises steadily with age at death; from age 65 to 90, it is higher for women;

- the percentage making a will rises with age, is higher for women, and at first rises sharply with estate size- although it is still only 90% for estates of around -200,000, a level not far short of the top quartile of the distribution of wealth at death;

- 16% of wills included a charitable bequest; the figure rises substantially with estate size - from 10% for the smallest estates in our data to 50% for the largest of over 3 million; there seems a sharper increase around the Inheritance Tax threshold, consistent with a theoretical model of the tax's impact, of about 2 percentage points; and

- higher wealth at death is associated with testators being more likely to leave anabsolute bequest, free of conditions, and more likely to leave a bequest of a specifi camount to charity, as opposed to a bequest of a residual share of the estate; 30% of all charitable bequests have conditions attached. It is the rise in absolute bequeathing that accounts for the rise in the bequest propen sity with estate size.
(Nardotto & C, '11)Nudging With Information: A Randomized Field Experiment On Reminders And Feedback
(Fong & O, '11)Truth In Giving: Experimental Evidence On The Welfare Effects Of Informed Giving To The Poor Info on recipients' deservingnessFull text
(Gall & R, '15)Losing Face
(Smith, '15)On The Nature Of Pessimism In Taking And Giving Games Full text
(Krier, '05)Fair Trade In Europe 2005: Facts And Figures On Fair Trade In 25 European Countries Full text
(List, '08)Introduction To Field Experiments In Economics With~Applications To The Economics Of Charity
(Mayo & T, '09)Warm Glow And Charitable Giving: Why The Wealthy Do Not Give More To Charity?
(Smith & o, '15)Modeling The Dynamics Of Contributions And Beliefs In Repeated Public Good Games Full text
(Gordon ea, '09)The Role Of Rating Agencies In The Market For Charitable Contributions: An Empirical Test
(List ea, '04)Examining The Role Of Social Isolation On Stated Preferences Full text
(Andreoni & P, '04)Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse Into Fund-Raising
(Andreoni, '90)Impure Altruism And Donations To Public Goods: A Theory Of Warm-Glow Giving
(Huck & R, '10)Transactions Costs In Charitable Giving: Evidence From Two Field ExperimentsField-exp-charity“Huck and Rasul conduct two experiments. In the first they assume that subjects who did not respond to an initial postal request to donate, but did respond to a reminder, responded to the reminder because it triggered a new draw from the same distribution of transaction costs (e.g., perhaps they were not as busy when the reminder letter arrived). There were a significant number of responses to the reminder letter, which Huck and Rasul argue implies the presence of transaction costs. … In Huck and Rasul's second experiment a solicitation letter is sent out for a separate fund raiser. Different treatments provide different payment options (a bank transfer versus a pre-filled bank transfer form or paying by credit card over the phone). When the transaction costs of donating were lower, the response rate was higher, but mean donations were not significantly different.”
(summary in Knowles & S, 2015)
Reduce transaction costs
(Okten & W, '00)Determinants Of Donations In Private Nonprofit Markets
(Soetevent, '11)Payment Choice, Image Motivation And Contributions To Charity: Evidence From A Field Experiment
(Kessler & M, '14)Identity In Charitable Giving
(Glazer & K, '08)A Signaling Explanation For Charity
(Schulz ea, '16)Nudging Generosity: Choice Architecture And Cognitive Factors In Charitable Giving
(Bekkers, '05)It’S Not All In The Ask: Effects And Effectiveness Of Recruitment Strategies Used By Nonprofits In The Netherlands
(Onderstal ea, '13)Bidding To Give In The FieldField-exp-charity (All-pay) Auctions, Lotteries/rafflesFull text
(Suvorov & V, '08)Goal Setting As A Self-Regulation Mechanism
(Anik ea, '09)Feeling Good About Giving: The Benefits (And Costs) Of Self-Interested Charitable Behavior
(Bekkers & W, '10)A Literature Review Of Empirical Studies Of PhilanthropyMeta-analysis/lit survey
(Verkaik, '16)Do Donors Really Care About Impact Information? A Dual Process Account “Output information has a significant effect on generosity, mediated by the perceived prosocial impact of a gift, but the additional increase in generosity when adding impact information on top does not reach significance. ”
KK: “this may be because donors are not in a deliberate decision making mode. When in that mode, only highly educated donors increased giving when presented with both output and impact.”
"Impact" (per $) infoFull text
(Charness & G, '08)What'S In A Name? Anonymity And Social Distance In Dictator And Ultimatum Games
(Falk, '04)Charitable Giving As A Gift Exchange-Evidence From A Field Experiment
(Erkal ea, '11)Relative Earnings And Giving In A Real-Effort Experiment
(Bolton & K, '98)An Experimental Test Of The Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature Of Beneficent Behavior
(Frey & M, '04)Social Comparisons And Pro-Social Behavior: Testing Textquotedblleftconditional Cooperationtextquotedblright In A Field ExperimentField-exp-charity Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Ek, '17)Some Causes Are More Equal Than Others? The Effect Of Similarity On Substitution In Charitable GivingLab-charity> AIn an experimental dictator game where subjects may donate [via real effort] to two different real-world charities, we simulate activity-specific interventions by varying the relative productivity of those charities, and introduce several treatments to test whether (i) subjects substitute across charities, and (ii) whether substitution occurs even across (possibly very) dissimilar alternatives. We find that significant substitution occurs in all cases, but that the effect is weaker the more dissimilar the charity alternatives. In our most dissimilar treatment, substitution is only half as large as when alternatives are very similar.Charities collaborate/compete
(Gupta ea, '06)Are Donor Countries Giving More Or Less Aid?
(Fehr & G, '00)Fairness And Retaliation: The Economics Of Reciprocity Full text
(Newman & S, '12)The Counterintuitive Effects Of Thank-You Gifts On Charitable GivingField-exp-charity Thank you notes/giftsFull text
(Eckel & G, '06)Do Donors Care About Subsidy Type? An Experimental Study
(Randolph, '95)Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, And The Timing Of Charitable Contributions Full text
(Corrish, '11)Grounds For Complaint
(Aknin ea, '12)Giving Leads To Happiness In Young Children
(Sass ea, '12)The Dynamics Of Individual Preferences In Repeated Public Good Experiments
(Kellner ea, '15)Giving And Probability
(Shang & C, '09)A Field Experiment In Charitable Contribution: The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public GoodsField-exp-charityAbstract
> We study the effect of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. Competing theories predict that others’ contributions might be either substitutes or complements to one's own. We demonstrate a positive social information effect on individual contributions, supporting theories of complementarities. We find the most influential level of social information is drawn from the 90th to 95th percentile of previous contributions. We furthermore find the effect to be significant for new members but not for renewing members. In the most effective condition, social information increases contributions by 12% ($13). These increased contributions do not crowd out future contributions.
Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Adena & H, '17)aMatching Donations Without Crowding Out? Some Theoretical Considerations, A Field, And A Lab ExperimentLab-charity, Field-exp-charity(quoting “Highlights”)

> Matching donations, while common in practice, has been shown to cause partial crowding out.

> Simple theoretical considerations suggest that using matching funds for an alternative project may improve outcomes.

> Crowding out will be reduced if the second project is a substitute to the first and even more if it is a complement.

> Results from a field experiment indicate that crowding out can be reduced if matching funds are used for an alternative project.

> Our laboratory experiment further confirms the superior performance of using matching funds for a complementary project.
(Breman & G, '08)The More We Know, The More We Care? Identification And Deservingness In A Cross-Border Experiment
(Andreoni & M, '02)Giving According To Garp: An Experimental Test Of The Consistency Of Preferences For Altruism Full text
(Ribar & W, '95)Charitable Contributions To International Relief And Development
(Ribar & W, '02)Altruistic And Joy-Of-Giving Motivations In Charitable Behavior
(Andreoni ea, '11)Diversity And Donations: The Effect Of Religious And Ethnic Diversity On Charitable Giving
(Underwood ea, '76)Attention, Negative Affect, And Altruism: An Ecological Validation
(Kogut & R, '05)bThe Singularity Effect Of Identified Victims In Separate And Joint Evaluations Teach "Identifiable victims bias"
(Cardenas ea, '05)Experiments And Economic Development: Lessons From Field Labs In The Developing World
(Felső & S, '14)Broad And Narrow Bracketing In Gift Certificate Spending Full text
(Potters ea, '05)After You—Endogenous Sequencing In Voluntary Contribution GamesLab-noncharity
(Vickrey, '62)One Economist'S View Of Philanthropy
(Damgaard & G, '17)Now Or Never! The Effect Of Deadlines On Charitable Giving: Evidence From Two Natural Field Experiments Deadlines
(List & L, '02)The Effects Of Seed Money And Refunds On Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence From A University Capital CampaignField-exp-charityAbstract:
> We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced “seed money” will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold increase in contributions, with significant effects on both participation rates and average gift size. Imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20 percent, with significant effects on average gift size.
Refund donations if target not reached, Seed donationsFull text
(Filiz-Ozbay & U, '18)Demand For Giving To Multiple Charities: An Experimental StudyLab-charity> Our theory predicts that an increase in the rebate rate offered by a given charity relative to a substitute charity will shift donations away from the substitute charity, but this “stealing” effect is not expected when complementary charities are considered. … experimental results support our theoretical predictions.Charities collaborate/competeFull text
(Vesterlund, '12)Voluntary Giving To Public Goods: Moving Beyond The Linear Vcm Full text
(List, '07)On The Interpretation Of Giving In Dictator Games
(Scharf ea, '17)Lift And Shift: The Effect Of Fundraising Interventions In Charity Space And TimeCausal-observational (IV etc)- Data from Charities Aid Foundation, 130,000 individual charity accounts, 2009-2014; covers 6 major disasters

- Increase in giving after disaster appeal, no reduced giving to international relief later on

- 'Fail to reject zero substitution' of all other charity, with 'precisely estimated' effects

- Time-shifting: Giving to *all* charities, even unrelated ones, increase in the 5 weeks after disaster, but decrease in weeks 6-13
Charities collaborate/compete
(Kreps ea, '82)Rational Cooperation In The Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
(Dickert ea, '10)Affective Motivations To Help Others: A Two-Stage Model Of Donation DecisionsHypothetical/intentional experiment
(Bekkers & W, '07)Generosity And Philanthropy: A Literature ReviewMeta-analysis/lit survey
(Filippin & C, '16)A Reconsideration Of Gender Differences In Risk Attitudes
(Kahn, '03)The Death Toll From Natural Disasters: The Role Of Income, Geography And Institutions
(Backus, '08)Substituting Donkeys For Religion?: Testing The Homogeneity Of Philanthropy
(Deryugina & M, '15)Do Causes Crowd Each Other Out? Evidence From Tornado StrikesCausal-observational (IV etc)Result: Donations in a state affected by a tornado (causing 10+ injuries) increase by 1.7-2\% in that year and 1.9-2\% percent in the 2 years after

They argue that this is evidence against (complete) crowding out
Charities collaborate/competeFull text
(Chua & W, '03)The Role Of United Charities In Fundraising: The Case Of Singapore
(Summers ea, '94)‘Psychophysical Numbing’: An Empirical Basis For Perceptions Of Collective Violence
(Damgaard & G, '18)The Hidden Costs Of Nudging: Experimental Evidence From Reminders In FundraisingField-exp-charity Nudging backfire (caution)Full text
(Backus & o, '10)Is Charity A Homogeneous Good?
(Sugden, '84)Reciprocity: The Supply Of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions Full text
(Bohm & R, '13)Charitable Giving Among Females And Males: An Empirical Test Of The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis
(Zagefka & J, '15)The Psychology Of Charitable Donations To Disaster Victims And BeyondMeta-analysis/lit survey Full text
(Lacetera ea, '12)Will There Be Blood? Incentives And Displacement Effects In Pro-Social Behavior
(Camerer ea, '97)Labor Supply Of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day At A Time
(Kopelman & T, '98)The Effect Of Mood On Social Value Orientation: Positive Mood Induces Prosocial Behavior While Negative Mood Induces Individualistic And Competitive Behavior Make people happy
(Taussig, '67)Economic Aspects Of The Personal Income Tax Treatment Of Charitable Contributions
(Berman ea, '18)Impediments To Effective Altruism: The Role Of Subjective Preferences In Charitable GivingHypothetical/intentional experimentAbstract:

> We found that even when effectiveness information is made easily comparable across options, it has a limited impact on choice. Specifically, people frequently choose less effective charity options when those options represent more subjectively preferred causes. In contrast to making a personal donation decision, outcome metrics are used to a much greater extent when choosing financial investments and when allocating aid resources as an agent of an organization

Note: these are all *hypothetical* choices.

This paper extends previous research on how people “appear to be -distorted altruists— they care about welfare maximization, but without clear information to make comparisons, they rely on their feelings to guide choice (Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007)”. The novelty here is the use of “effectiveness information is provided across multiple different causes” rather than a single cause.

Their main theoretical characterization of their results:

> …individuals view charity as a relatively subjective decision … believing that charity is a subjective decision licenses individuals to donate in personally gratifying ways at the cost of maximizing welfare

Summary of results

Note, all studies use behavioral lab/students or Mturkers; all decisions are hypothetical.

Study 1: Perceived Subjectivity of Charity – In rating statements (1-7 likert) like “It is important that the I choose reflects my personal tastes or values” vs “It is more important to rely on objective measures rather than personal feelings when choosing“ … they agreed more with the *subjective/taste* approach for charity relative to choosing investments, cel phones, or (marginally) restaurants, but less so than for a piece of art.

Study 2: Personal Feelings Versus Welfare Gains – ” When participants read that Mary felt an emotional connection with distant charities, they responded that she should donate to Hunger Care in Africa (M = 5.26, SD = 2.05) and also evaluated it as being more effective (M = 5.59, SD = 1.87), t(197) = -1.19, p = .24, d = −0.17, 95% CI = [−0.44, 0.11]. However, when Mary felt connected to local communities, they indicated that she should donate to Jump Start Your Community (M = 3.00, SD = 1.99), despite indicating that Hunger Care in Africa was more effective (M = 4.55, SD = 2.32), t(202) = -5.12, p < .001, d = −0.72, 95% CI = [-1.00, −0.43].“

- but note that Mary's connection to the charity also affects the stated “effectiveness” response!

Study 3: Charity Versus Investment Choice: Subjects assigned categories and fictional examples of either charities or investment, and told their domain category and effectiveness. Asked to sort these [how justified?], “significantly fewer participants chose to sort by effectiveness rating in the charity condition (67.8%) than in the investment condition (83.4%), -2 (1, N = 401) = 13.20, p < .001, - = .1” “Significantly fewer participants chose the highest rated option in the charity condition (32.2%) than in the investment condition (50.3%), -2 (1, N = 401) = 13.52, p < .001, - = .1”

Study 4: Decision-Making Role and Welfare Maximization
2×2 – Participants given a “donor condition” or a “president of a local medical research center” condition and were [not] given effectiveness ratings for each “department (arthritis = 92, heart disease = 86, cancer = 74). … selected so that the most intuitively appealing choice was rated as the least effective (cancer)”

“Results revealed a significant Role - Effectiveness Ratings interaction”; the effectiveness information had a positive impact for both, but a larger one in the “president” scenario [But is this specific scenario comparison s relevant to charities; hospital president has a distinct role, and this was a choice essentially within the *same* charity]

Study 5: Judgments of Decision Quality
Similar setup as study 4, but subjects assess the (“percieved”) “decision quality” and “altruism”. Analogous results to study 4 for both. [The altruism result is puzzling: what justifies this? Are they answering these questions carefully?]
"Impact" (per $) info
(Gneezy ea, '14)Avoiding Overhead Aversion In CharityField-exp-charity, Lab-charity Pre-cover overhead costsFull text
(Koch & N, '11)Self-Regulation Through Goal Settingast
(Exley & P, '18)The Impact Of A Surprise Donation Ask
(Kuhn ea, '08)The Own And Social Effects Of An Unexpected Income Shock: Evidence From The Dutch Postcode Lottery
(Aknin & o, ')Charitable Fundraising And Smart Giving
(Meer & R, '11)The Abcs Of Charitable Solicitation
(Grossman, '10)Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling In Giving
(Duncan, '09)Secret Santa Reveals The Secret Side Of Giving
(Lockwood, '12)Bequest Motives And The Annuity Puzzle
(Kessler, '17)Announcements Of Support And Public Good Provision
(Falk & F, '06)A Theory Of Reciprocity Full text
(Wiepking ea, '11)Motives And Barriers To Bequest Giving Whom to targetFull text
(Eisensee & S, '07)News Droughts, News Floods, And U. S. Disaster Relief
(Li ea, '11)Giving To Government: Voluntary Taxation In The Lab
(Kellner ea, '15)Stochastic Income And Conditional Generosity
(Falkinger, '96)Efficient Private Provision Of Public Goods By Rewarding Deviations From Average
(Smeets ea, '15)Giving Behavior Of Millionaires Millionaires are more generous in dictator games than any other group studied in the literature. Yet, millionaires reduce their generosity in a bargaining context (ultimatum game). For fund raisers, it is therefore important to tap into the giving mindset of the wealthy and prevent an exchange focus like: “You give, you get”.Kama Muta, Give donor controlFull text
(Kinsbergen & T, '13)Explaining Monetary Donations To International Development Organisations: A Factorial Survey ApproachHypothetical surveyAbstract: This article investigates what type of international development organisations potential donors would prefer to donate to. We constructed 960 scenarios in which a fictive development organisation was described. The scenarios were randomly varied across eight characteristics of the organisation: size, familiarity, experience, religious character, number of different projects run by the organisation, number of countries in which the organisation is active, overhead costs and staff composition. A large representative sample of the Dutch population (N = 2,758) received six randomly allocated scenarios and had to decide if, and if so, how much they would donate to the depicted (fictive) organisation. Results demonstrate that donors have a preference for familiar organisations with several years of experience. Although donors have a strong aversion regarding overhead costs, we find that donors seem to value the capacities of paid staff members and are, to a certain extent, willing to pay a price for these. The ideal development organisation combines features typical of small(er) scale voluntary development organisations (e.g. mainly run by volunteers) and large® scale professional organisations (e.g. running development programmes in numerous countries).Pre-cover overhead costs
(Schervish & H, '98)Money And Magnanimity: New Findings On The Distribution Of Income, Wealth, And Philanthropy
(Charness & K, '11)Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn From The Lab?
(Soetevent, '05)Anonymity In Giving In A Natural Context-A Field Experiment In 30 Churches Visibility/publicityFull text
(Yörük, '13)The Impact Of Charitable Subsidies On Religious Giving And Attendance: Evidence From Panel Data Full text
(Ariely ea, '09)Doing Good Or Doing Well? Image Motivation And Monetary Incentives In Behaving Prosocially
(Von & W, '09)Charitable Giving And Fundraising: When Beneficiaries Bother Benefactors
(Baron, '97)Confusion Of Relative And Absolute Risk In Valuation Ari:

> Findings: Willingness to pay for intervention affected by both Total Lives Saved (90 vs. 900) but also by Ratio Saved to Diseased (.09 vs. .90)

“Some subjects evaluate health benefits in terms of the proportion of lives saved rather than the number.”

> Numeracy failure and Evaluability bias. Hypothesized, not examined. People are confused by quantities in general, ratio is easy to evaluate


> Subjects were less willing to pay for government medical insurance for diseases when the number of people who
could not be cured was higher, holding constant the number who could be cured. In a second experiment,
willingness to pay (from a hypothetical government windfall) for risk reduction was unaffected by whether the
risk was described in terms of percentage or number of lives saved, even though subjects knew that the risks in
question differed in prevalence. These results are consistent with the findings of Fetherstonhaugh et al., Jenni and
Loewenstein, and others. I suggest that these results can be explained in terms of a general tendency to confuse
proportions and differences, a confusion that is analogous to other confusions of quantitative dimensions in
children, adults, the news media, and perhaps even the epidemiological literature.
Full text
(Ermisch & G, '10)Do Strong Family Ties Inhibit Trust?
(Gertler, '15)Charitable Fundraising And Smart Giving: How Can Charities Use Behavioral Science To Drive Donations Full text
(Cialdini & S, '76)Increasing Compliance By Legitimizing Paltry Contributions: When Even A Penny Helps. Ask for *small* donationFull text
(Gneezy ea, '12)Pay-What-You-Want, Identity, And Self-Signaling In Markets
(Coricelli ea, '03)Partner Selection In Public Goods Experiments Full text
(Reinstein & S, '12)Efficient Consumer Altruism And Fair Trade Products
(Meer, '17)Are Overhead Costs A Good Guide For Charitable Giving? Pre-cover overhead costs
(Kogut & R, '05)aThe Identified Victim Effect: An Identified Group, Or Just A Single Individual?Lab-charity, Hypothetical/intentional experiment Teach "Identifiable victims bias"Full text
(Croson & M, '01)The Effect Of Recommended Contributions In The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods
(Lesner & R, '14)The Identifiable Victim Effect In Charitable Giving: Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment Finds a null effect but appears fairly underpowered (can't rule out a +25% effect perhaps?).
(Di ea, '13)Characterizing Financial And Statistical Literacy
(Gneezy & L, '06)Putting Behavioral Economics To Work: Testing For Gift Exchange In Labor Markets Using Field Experiments Gift for donorsFull text
(Charness & D, '03)Promises And Partnership
(Weyant & S, '87)Getting More By Asking For Less: The Effects Of Request Size On Donations Of Charity1
(Clark, '02)House Money Effects In Public Good Experiments
(Laibson ea, '98)Self-Control And Saving For Retirement
(Rondeau & L, '08)Matching And Challenge Gifts To Charity: Evidence From~Laboratory And Natural Field ExperimentsLab-charity, Field-exp-charity“…direct mail fundraising campaign for the Sierra Club (n = 3,000) in which some letters described a match offer, with every dollar in donations later matched by a dollar from a lead donor. In other letters, researchers referenced a “challenge gift” already contributed by a lead donor. Mentioning a challenge gift increased participation rates by 23% and total contributions by 18%, compared to a plain ask. The challenge gift also outperformed the amount raised under the match offer by 31% (Rondeau and List 2008).” (ideas42)Seed donationsFull text
(Duncan, '04)A Theory Of Impact Philanthropy Full text
(Camerer, '88)Gifts As Economic Signals And Social Symbols
(UK BIT, '2013)Applying Behavioural Insights To Charitable Giving “Many of our customers like to leave money to charity in their will. Are there any causes you are passionate about?” …”Clients in the second group were 43% more likely to participate in legacy giving.”Auto-index
(Ratner ea, '11)The Norm Of Self-Interest: Implications For Charitable Giving people feel it is only culturally acceptable to donate to causes in which they have a personal stake Full text
(Atkinson ea, '12)Charitable Giving For Overseas Development: Uk Trends Over A Quarter Century
(Levitt & L, '15)What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About The Real World? Full text
(Pelsmacker ea, '05)aDo Consumers Care About Ethics? Willingness To Pay For Fair-Trade Coffee
(Willemain ea, '94)Alumni Giving: The Influences Of Reunion, Class, And Year
(Rose-Ackerman, '96)Altruism, Nonprofits, And Economic Theory Full text
(Baron & S, '11)Heuristics And Biases In CharityMeta-analysis/lit survey, Hypothetical survey
(Komter, '96)The Gift: An Interdisciplinary Perspective
(Andreoni & V, '01)Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism
(Heutel, '12)Crowding Out And Crowding In Of Private Donations And Government Grants
(Weyant, '96)Application Of Compliance Techniques To Direct-Mail Requests For Charitable Donations
(Hugh-Jones & R, '09)Secret Santa: Anonymity, Signaling, And Conditional Cooperation
(Kamenica, '12)Behavioral Economics And Psychology Of Incentives
(Levati ea, '07)Leading By Example In A Public Goods Experiment With Heterogeneity And Incomplete Information
(Bolton & Z, '95)Anonymity Versus Punishment In Ultimatum Bargaining
(Andreoni & P, '11)Is Crowding Out Due Entirely To Fundraising? Evidence From A Panel Of CharitiesEconomic theory
(Strong, '97)The Problems Of Translating Fair Trade Principles Into Consumer Purchase Behaviour
(Hickman, '15)Who Gives To Effective Charities? What Makes Them Give?
(Huck & R, '11)Matched Fundraising: Evidence From A Natural Field ExperimentField-exp-charity Offer a matching donation, Seed donationsFull text
(Katzev, '95)Applying Social Psychology To Charitable Donations: Three Experiments On Nonprofit Fundraising
(Kogut & R, '11)The Identifiable Victim Effect: Causes And Boundary Conditions Individual/identifiable victimFull text
(Oppenheimer & O, '11)The Science Of Giving: Experimental Approaches To The Study Of Charity
(Dawes & T, '88)Anomalies: Cooperation
(Karlsson ea, '09)The Ostrich Effect: Selective Attention To Information
(List, '11)The Market For Charitable Giving
(Brosig ea, '07)Selfish In The End?: An Investigation Of Consistency And Stability Of Individual Behavior
(Luo ea, ')A Double-Edged Sword: Using Public Recognition To Encourage Individual Charitable Giving.–Evidence From A Field Experiment In China
(Lankford & W, '91)Modeling Charitable Giving Using A Box-Cox Standard Tobit Model Full text
(Small ea, '07)aSympathy And Callousness: The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims Study 3: “individuals who faced an identifiable victim donated more than those who faced victim statistics, p < .01, and also donated more than those who faced an identifiable victim in conjunction with statistics, p < .05.”

Study 4: “ Priming analytic thinking reduced donations to an identifiable victim relative to a feeling-based thinking prime. Yet, the primes had no distinct effect on donations to statistical victims, which is symptomatic of the difficulty in generating feelings for these victims.” [Note that the latter non-effect appears tightly bounded.]

Further results on emotional mediators/channels

Ideas42: > Researchers gave study participants the opportunity to donate $0-5 to famine relief efforts at Save the Children (n = 159). One group received letters that included a picture and brief description of a little girl. A second group received letters describing factual information about food security, and a third group received letters with both the little girl’s profile and factual information. The photo and description prompted an emotion-based response, raising more than twice as much money as the factual solicitation. Including factual information with the girl’s profile reduced this effect, with no significant difference in giving between those who received both pieces and those who received factual information only
Effectiveness info: deliberation
(Brandts & C, '11)The Strategy Versus The Direct-Response Method: A First Survey Of Experimental Comparisons
(Bristol, '90)The Life Cycle Of Alumni Donations
(Guala, '05)The Methodology Of Experimental Economics
(Feldman ea, '15)When Empathy Succeeds And Fails: Public Support For Social Welfare Policies
(Bryan ea, '10)Commitment Devices
(Eckel ea, '05)An Experimental Test Of The Crowding Out Hypothesis
(Yörük, '10)Charitable Giving By Married Couples Revisited
(Castillo ea, '14)Fundraising Through Online Social Networks: A Field Experiment On Peer-To-Peer Solicitation Tools for Motivating Effective Charitable Giving
(Andreoni & S, '16)Time-Inconsistent Charitable GivingLab-charity Thank you notes/gifts
(Andreoni, '06)Leadership Giving In Charitable Fund-Raising
(Kraut, '73)Effects Of Social Labeling On Giving To Charity
(Keck & K, '09)Does Competition Foster Trust? The Role Of Tournament Incentives
(Aldashev ea, '14)Brothers In Alms? Coordination Between Nonprofits On Markets For Donations Full text
(Bryant ea, '03)Participation In Philanthropic Activities: Donating Money And Time
(Eckel & G, '98)Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence From Dictator Experiments Full text
(Hugh-Jones & R, '13)Targeted Exclusion Can Reduce Cooperation In Public Goods Games
(Dur & G, '08)The Desire For Impact
(Okten ea, '16)Life Satisfaction And Charitable Giving: New Evidence From The Psid
(Porta ea, '96)Trust In Large Organizations
(Karlan & M, '14)Hey Look At Me: The Effect Of Giving Circles On GivingField-exp-charity Visibility/publicityFull text
(Brown ea, '17)Social Distance And Quality Ratings In Charity Choice Full text
(Andreoni & P, '13)Charitable Giving Full text
(Paskalev & Y, '14)A Theory Of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn Into 'Pennies For Charity'
(Fehr & G, '02)Do Workers Work More If Wages Are High? Evidence From A Randomized Field Experiment
(Bochet ea, '06)Communication And Punishment In Voluntary Contribution Experiments
(Borgloh, '09)Have You Paid Your Dues? On The Impact Of The German Church Tax On Private Charitable Contributions
(Andreoni & R, '11)The Power Of Asking: How Communication Affects Selfishness, Empathy, And Altruism
(Sargeant ea, '06)Benchmarking Charity Performance: Returns From Direct Marketing In Fundraising Full text
(Trope & L, '10)Construal-Level Theory Of Psychological Distance.
(Exley, '15)Excusing Selfishness In Charitable Giving: The Role Of RiskLab-charity Avoid uncertainties/excuses
(Keating ea, '81)United Way Contributions: Coercion, Charity Or Economic Self-Interest? Full text
(Carrigan & A, '01)The Myth Of The Ethical Consumer Textendash Do Ethics Matter In Purchase Behaviour?
(Harbaugh, '98)The Prestige Motive For Making Charitable Transfers Visibility/publicity, Recognition tiersFull text
(Fetherstonhaugh ea, '97)Insensitivity To The Value Of Human Life: A Study Of Psychophysical NumbingHypothetical/intentional experimentAbstract:
> Studies 1 and 2 found that an intervention saving a fixed number of lives was judged significantly more beneficial when fewer lives were at risk overall. Study 3 found that respondents wanted the
minimum number of lives a medical treatment would have to save to merit a fixed amount of funding to be much greater for a disease with a larger number of potential victims than for a disease with a smaller number.

> Study 1: Respondents evaluated the programs in pairs, one pair per page

> We predicted that preference ratings would be greater for the small-camp program than the large-camp program. Because these programs were never paired together, however, we compared respondents’ ratings for the two Rwandan programs in pairings that shared a common non-Rwandan program

> Even though most respondents realized that the same number of refugees could be saved in either camp, they preferred the small-camp program (M 5 .45) over the large-camp program (M 5 2.20) when paired with either the transportation or employment programs.

> Study 2 omitted dummy scenarios and had respondents evaluate Rwandan scenarios individually.

> … manipulated three within-subjects variables: size of refugee camp (11,000 or 250,000), amount of pure-water aid a camp was receiving before a water-purification plane was sent (low or high), and reliability of the plane (60% or 100%). … eight different scenarios participants read… 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures factorial design. All respondents evaluated the same eight scenarios

> two dependent variables: (1) the rated benefit of sending a plane, and (2) a yes/no decision on whether or not to send a plane.

> A 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA on respondents’ benefit ratings provided strong support for the psychophysical numbing hypothesis (see Figure 2). A significant main effect for camp size, F (1, 132) 160.5, p .001, indicated that respondents believed sending the planes to small camps was more beneficial (M 6.46) than sending them to large camps (M 4.54). A main effect for the prior-aid variable, F (1, 132) 15.35, p .001, indicated that respondents believed sending the planes to camps that were already satisfying a substantial portion of their clean-water need was more beneficial (M 5.73) than sending them to camps that were only satisfying a small portion of their water need (M 5.27).

> Participants were less likely to allocate money to a hypothetical refugee camp when they could only save 1500 lives out of 250,000 refugees rather than 1500 lives out of 11,000. … Fetherstonhaugh et al. use the term “drop in the bucket” to describe the thought process that might bring about these decisions: saving a tiny percentage of a population could feel useless even if 1500 individuals still get the chance to live.
Present small "base group", frame the problem as limited in scaleFull text
(Camerer, '98)Prospect Theory In The Wild: Evidence From The Field
(Steinberg, '86)Should Donors Care About Fundraising
(DellaVigna ea, '09)Testing For Altruism And Social Pressure In Charitable Giving Info on recipients' deservingness
(Burrows & L, '94)The Impact Of Fairness On Bargaining Behaviour
(McKenzie, '08)Tax Or Beg? Mandatory Payments To Charity And Their Effects On Donor Behavior
(Kaplan & R, '09)In Search Of Welfare-Improving Gifts
(Strömberg, '07)Natural Disasters, Economic Development, And Humanitarian Aid
(MacGillivray, '00)The Fair Share: The Growing Market Share Of Green And Ethical Products
(Meier, '06)Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving In The Long Run? Matching Donations In A Field Experiment Offer a matching donation
(Fraser, '18)Faith, Hope, And Christian Charity: How Religion Explains Giving When Warm Glow And Impure Altruism Do Not
(Kahneman & K, '92)Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase Of Moral Satisfaction
(Exley & P, '16)Finding Excuses To Decline The Ask
(Isen & N, '79)The Effect Of Photographs Of The Handicapped On Donation To Charity: When A Thousand Words May Be Too Much Negative/positive framing
(Eckel & G, '96)Altruism In Anonymous Dictator Games Full text
(Croson, '98)Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games
(Jones & L, '13)Wallflowers: Experimental Evidence Of An Aversion To Standing OutLab-charity, Field-exp-charity Visibility/publicity
(Feldstein & C, '76)Tax Incentives And Charitable Contributions In The United States: A Microeconometric Analysis
(Diepen ea, '06)Irritation Due To Direct Mailings From Charities
(Kellner ea, '17)Commitments To “Give If You Win” Exceed Donations After A WinField-exp-charity, Lab-charity Give if you winFull text
(Silva & T, '03)The Log Of Gravity Full text
(Keser & W, '00)Conditional Cooperation And Voluntary Contributions To Public Goods
(Weele, '09)The Signaling Power Of Sanctions In Social Dilemmas Full text
(Ledyard, '94)Public Goods: A Survey Of Experimental Research
(Eshuis & H, '03)Making Trade Work For The Producers: 15 Years Of Fairtrade Labelled Coffee In The Netherlands Full text
(Cotterill ea, '12)The Impact Of A Pledge Request And The Promise Of Publicity: A Randomized Controlled Trial Of Charitable DonationsField-exp-charity“Combining a pledge request and the promise of local publicity increases individual charitable donations.” (pledge alone had insignificant effect)Visibility/publicity
(List & R, '03)The Impact Of Challenge Gifts On Charitable Giving: An Experimental Investigation
(Genevsky ea, '13)Neural Underpinnings Of The Identifiable Victim Effect: Affect Shifts Preferences For Giving
(Locke & L, '02)Building A Practically Useful Theory Of Goal Setting And Task Motivation: A 35-Year Odyssey.
(Levati ea, '11)Are Conditional Cooperators Willing To Forgo Efficiency Gains? Evidence From A Public Goods Experiment
(Elfenbein ea, '12)Charity As A Substitute For Reputation: Evidence From An Online MarketplaceCausal-observational (IV etc) Donations tied to purchases
(Chang ea, '98)Money Matters: Personal Giving In American Churches
(Chaudhuri & P, '10)Does Strategic Play Explain The Decay In Contributions In A Public Goods Game? Experimental Evidence
(Huffman & B, '04)Riches To Rags Every Month? The Fall In Consumption Expenditures Between Paydays
(Mittone & P, '06)Is It Just Legitimacy Of Endowments? An Experimental Analysis Of Unilateral Giving
(Knowles & S, '15)Transaction Costs, The Opportunity Cost Of Time And Procrastination In Charitable GivingLab-charity Reduce transaction costs
(Atkinson, '12)Disasters, Donors, And Democracy: Matching Donor Types And Aid Channels In Post-Disaster Humanitarian Aid Giving
(Karlan ea, '10)Getting To The Top Of Mind: How Reminders Increase Saving
(Auten ea, '02)Charitable Giving, Income, And Taxes: An Analysis Of Panel Data Full text
(Eckel ea, '05)Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: A Field Test Comparing Matching And Rebate Subsidies
(Lindskold ea, '77)The Effects Of Directness Of Face-To-Face Requests And Sex Of Solicitor On Streetcorner Donations
(Kirchsteiger ea, '06)Your Morals Might Be Your Moods
(Rotemberg, '06)Altruism, Reciprocity And Cooperation In The Workplace
(Hayes, '06)On The Efficiency Of Fair Trade
(Croson & S, '07)Field Experiments In Charitable Contribution:The Impact Of Social Influence On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods
(Behrman ea, '96)College Choice And Wages: Estimates Using Data On Female Twins
(Meer, '14)Effects Of The Price Of Charitable Giving: Evidence From An Online Crowdfunding Platform Full text
(Cairns & S, '11)Substitution Effects Across Charitable Donations Charities collaborate/compete
(Romano & Y, '01)Why Charities Announce Donations: A Positive Perspective
(Landry ea, '05)Toward An Understanding Of The Economics Of Charity: Evidence From A Field ExperimentField-exp-charity Offer a matching donation
(Meer, '17)Does Fundraising Create New Giving?Natural experiment “while matches increase giving to eligible requests, they do not appear to crowd out giving to similar ones, either contemporaneously or over time.”

- Matching campaigns at increases (likelihood of, amount of) funding for one project

- But no significant impact on donations to other projects

Consider: Context, statistical power, potential for crowding out;
Offer a matching donationFull text
(Benartzi, '12)Save More Tomorrow: Practical Behavioral Finance Solutions To Improve 401 (K) Plans
(Sagarin ea, '14)An Ethical Approach To Peeking At Data
(Karlan & L, '07)Does Price Matter In Charitable Giving? Evidence From A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment Offer a matching donation, Donor's political preferences
(Straub, '03)Fundraising And Crowd-Out Of Charitable Contributions: New Evidence From Contributions To Public Radio
(Brock ea, '13)Dictating The Risk: Experimental Evidence On Giving In Risky Environments
(Cuddy ea, '07)The Bias Map: Behaviors From Intergroup Affect And Stereotypes. Info: make recipient feel "close"
(Kranich, '94)Gift Equilibria And Pareto Optimality Reconsidered
(Hall, '10)The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff In Public Sector Charity Provision
(Burger ea, '04)What A Coincidence! The Effects Of Incidental Similarity On Compliance
(Benz & M, '06)Do People Behave In Experiments As In The Field? - Evidence From Donations
(Aaker & L, '08)The Happiness Of Giving: The Time-Ask Effect
(Cojoc & S, '12)Dishonesty And Charitable Behavior
(Reece, '79)Charitable Contributions: New Evidence On Household Behavior Full text
(Reinstein & R, '11)aDecomposing Desert And Tangibility Effects In A Charitable Giving ExperimentLab-charity Tangibility
(Edwards & L, '14)Toward An Understanding Of Why Suggestions Work In Charitable Fundraising: Theory And Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment Ask for *small* donation
(Dickson, '01)Utility Of No Sweat Labels For Apparel Consumers: Profiling Label Users And Predicting Their Purchases
(Abeler ea, '11)Reference Points And Effort Provision
(Gneezy & R, '00)A Fine Is A Price
(Ein-Gar & L, '13)Giving From A Distance: Putting The Charitable Organization At The Center Of The Donation Appeal
(Meyvis ea, '11)Precommitment To Charity Give more tomorrow
(Harbaugh, '98)What Do Donations Buy?: A Model Of Philanthropy Based On Prestige And Warm Glow
(Karlan & L, '12)How Can Bill And Melinda Gates Increase Other People'S Donations To Fund Public Goods?
(Carpenter & M, '10)Why Volunteer? Evidence On The Role Of Altruism, Image, And Incentives
(Hugh-Jones & L, '13)Intergroup Revenge: A Laboratory Experiment On The Causes
(Payne, '98)Does The Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? New Evidence From A Sample Of Non-Profit Firms
(Krieg & S, '14)When Charities Compete: A Laboratory Experiment With Simultaneous Public GoodsLab-noncharity Charities collaborate/competeFull text
(Breeze, '13)How Donors Choose Charities: The Role Of Personal Taste And Experiences In Giving Decisionsqualititive/interviews
(Wiepking, '10)Democrats Support International Relief And The Upper Class Donates To Art? How Opportunity, Incentives And Confidence Affect Donations To Different Types Of Charitable Organizations
(Knack & K, '97)Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
(Levine, '98)Modeling Altruism And Spitefulness In Experiments
(Simonson & T, '92)Choice In Context: Tradeoff Contrast And Extremeness Aversion
(Chaudhuri ea, '04)Social Learning And Norms In A Public Goods Experiment With Inter-Generational Advice
(Smith ea, '12)The Effect Of Social Information On Charitable Donations: Evidence From The (Running) Field
(Grossman & W, '13)Self-Image And Strategic Ignorance In Moral Dilemmas Full text
(Andreoni, '06)Philanthropy
(Bachke ea, '13)Eliciting Donor Preferences
(Meer, '11)Brother, Can You Spare A Dime? Peer Pressure In Charitable SolicitationNatural experiment Asker-donor connection, Personal ask, Solicitor characteristics, Reveal previous donationsFull text
(Carpenter ea, '10)Tournaments And Office Politics: Evidence From A Real Effort Experiment
(Angrist & P, '08)Mostly Harmless Econometrics : An Empiricist ' S Companion
(Koszegi & R, '06)A Model Of Reference-Dependent Preferences
(Andreoni ea, '96)Charitable Contributions Of Time And Money
(Drouvelis & G, '16)The Effects Of Induced Emotions On Pro-Social BehaviourLab-noncharity Make people happy
(Randal, '09)The Effect Of Researcher Scrutiny On Donation Behaviour
(Gangadharan ea, '13)Multiattribute Risk Aversion In Charitable Giving
(Reinstein, '11)Does One Charitable Contribution Come At The Expense Of Another?Causal-observational (IV etc)Reinstein 2011 BEJEAP: PSID data, some evidence of expenditure substitution, particularly for large givers, but identification (bounding below) requires particular assumptionsCharities collaborate/compete
(Cherry ea, '02)Hardnose The Dictator
(Levin & I, '75)Further Studies On The Effect Of Feeling Good On Helping
(Karlan ea, '11)Small Matches And Charitable Giving: Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment
(Adena & H, '17)bGiving Once, Giving Twice: A Two-Period Field Experiment On Narrow Framing In Charitable Giving > Abstract: Do donors examine a single ask to donate in isolation or do they consider that other and future asks may come along? In the first year of our field experiment, we vary whether or not potential donors are informed that the ask will be repeated in the following year. This information has dramatic effects on the amount given: if present, donations fall by around 40%. This indicates strong support for the prevalence of narrow framing which benefits the fundraiser. In the second year of our experiment we show that previous non-donors behave as if expecting future calls, regardless of whether they have been explicitly told or have simply observed two subsequent asks, that is, they are de-biased through learning. Finally, we document that donors from year 1 tend to give the same amount again in year 2 which generates a long-run effect of initial narrow
framing on donation amounts.
Charities collaborate/compete
(Harwell ea, '15)Did The Ice Bucket Challenge Drain The Philanthropic Reservoir?Lab-charity, field? Charities collaborate/competeFull text
(Vesterlund, '16)Using Experimental Methods To Understand Why And How We Give To Charity Full text
(Benson & C, '78)Soliciting Charity Contributions: The Parlance Of Asking For MoneyField-exp-charityAbstract:
>Investigated the effects of 3 verbally mediated variables on financial contributions in a door-to-door charity campaign. The relationship of race to contributions was also observed by using both Black and White Ss. 120 Black and 120 White Ss were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 verbal appeals in a 2 (High vs Low Dependency) by 2 (Internal vs External Causal Locus of Need) by 2 (Social Responsibility vs Good Feeling as a reason for giving) factorial design. Whites contributed more than Blacks, the external locus of need condition produced more giving than the internal condition, and persons who heard the “good feeling” reason donated more than those in the “social responsibility” condition. Additionally, a significant Causal Locus of Need by Reason for Giving interaction was found. The combination of external locus of need and “good feeling” was considerably more productive of contributions than the other 3 combinations.
High arousal/urgent advert
(Small, '11)Reference-Dependent Sympathy Frame recipient's "loss"
(Sugden, '83)On The Economics Of Philanthropy: Reply Full text
(Chaudhuri, '10)Sustaining Cooperation In Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey Of The Literature
(Locke & L, '90)A Theory Of Goal Setting & Task Performance
(Booth & W, '07)Half A Cheer For Fair Trade
(Reinstein, '10)Substitution Between (And Motivations For) Charitable Contributions: An Experimental StudyLab-charity Charities collaborate/compete
(Yörük, '12)The Effect Of Media On Charitable Giving And Volunteering: Evidence From The Textquotedblleftgive Fivetextquotedblright Campaign Full text
(Hodgkinson & W, '90)Giving And Volunteering In The United States
(Exley, '16)Using Charity Performance Metrics As An Excuse Not To Give Avoid uncertainties/excuses
(Warren & W, '91)Empathy, Effectiveness And Donations To Charity: Social Psychology'S ContributionField-exp-charity“Higher donations from subjects in the low need persistence condition” (the “immediate short-term needs of the sufferers” rather than “sufferers' ongoing, continuous long term needs”. Similar result for returning “support forms”. Combining these two responses, both the “low need persistence” and the “low need extent” treatment increased the response rate. However, the “low need extent” condition appears confounded with an identifiable victims effect, presenting “the plight of one Sudanese family” instead of having “made explicit the widespread nature of the crisis”.Individual/identifiable victim
(Brown ea, '12)Modelling Charitable Donations To An Unexpected Natural Disaster: Evidence From The U.S. Panel Study Of Income Dynamics
(Fehr & S, '06)The Economics Of Fairness, Reciprocity And Altruism–Experimental Evidence And New Theories
(Andrews ea, '08)The Legitimization Of Paltry Favors Effect: A Review And Meta-AnalysisMeta-analysis/lit survey Ask for *small* donationFull text
(Kircher ea, '09)Fairness: A Critique To The Utilitarian Approach
(Caviola ea, '14)The Evaluability Bias In Charitable Giving: Saving Administration Costs Or Saving Lives?Hypothetical/intentional experimentWe describe the “evaluability bias”: the tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower administrative expenses) but not for charities with high cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two charities simultaneously—thereby enabling comparative evaluation—they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness (Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful interpretation (Study 4).Joint evaluation of a metric

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  • Last modified: 2019/02/14 09:41
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