A large donor (or other organization, or group of individuals, etc.) may offer to “match” donations. E.g., a “1-for-1 match” for every $1 donated, they may agree to donate another dollar. These matches can be at different rates (50%, 200%, etc), and they may have limits (e.g., up to a total of $200,000).

Alternative tool name:

Tool variation:

Category: Incentives/gifts

Sub-category: Direct incentive

Relevant theories: Public goods, Optimization, Impact, Warm glow - sophisticated, Dual systems (system 2)

Type of evidence: Field-exp-charity, Field-exp-charity

Evidence strength (ad hoc assessment): 7

There is some evidence that the presence of a match does increase out-of-pocket donations (Karlan and List); however, it works in an unpredictable way and may act simply as a signal. It may even be counterproductive (Huck and Rasul, '11), better to be simply a 'lead gift'. However, we have evidence from only a few selected field experiments, not from a broad range of settings. Meier ('07) finds the positive (participation?) effect may be crowded-out in the longer run when the match is removed.

Prevalence:

• Does Price Matter In Charitable Giving? Evidence From A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment

• Matched Fundraising: Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment, Full text

• Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving In The Long Run? Matching Donations In A Field Experiment

• Encouraging Giving: Subsidies In The Field, Full text

• How Sunday, Price, And Social Norms Influence Donation Behaviour

• Does Fundraising Create New Giving?, Full text

• Toward An Understanding Of The Economics Of Charity: Evidence From A Field Experiment

• papers

Contributors David Reinstein