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tables:tools [2019/02/27 12:25]
david
tables:tools [2019/03/16 23:00]
katja
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 | [[tools:​Influence others|Influence others]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | (Tell) donors that their donations will be reported to other potential future donors. ​ This may motivate them to get more in order to set an example and positively influence later donors. | Mixed, but still underpowered evidence (of desire for lead contributors to give more to influence others) | [[papers:​Reputation And Influence In Charitable Giving An Experiment|(Reinstein & R, '​11)b]],​ [[papers:​Hey Look At Me The Effect Of Giving Circles On Giving|(Karlan & M, '14)]] | | [[tools:​Influence others|Influence others]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | (Tell) donors that their donations will be reported to other potential future donors. ​ This may motivate them to get more in order to set an example and positively influence later donors. | Mixed, but still underpowered evidence (of desire for lead contributors to give more to influence others) | [[papers:​Reputation And Influence In Charitable Giving An Experiment|(Reinstein & R, '​11)b]],​ [[papers:​Hey Look At Me The Effect Of Giving Circles On Giving|(Karlan & M, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Give if you win|Give if you win]] | <popover content="​When do you ask for donations and commitments?​ From what sources of income (regular income, bonuses, tax refunds...)?​ Do you ask for commitments that are *conditional* on certain outcomes? When will the pledged donations actually be made, and with what pattern over time?" trigger='​hover'>​Timing/​conditionality,​ income source</​popover>​ | Ask for *conditional* commitments from uncertain unrealized income. E.g., ask "if you get a raise next year, would you donate 10%  of your salary increase?" ​ This can be a nonbinding pledge you're reminded of, or a more formal commitment. (See giveifyouwin.org.) | People facing uncertain gains donate more if asked to donate in advance, conditionally on positive outcome. Also, people who have just failed to win a bonus are particularly unlikely to donate (relative to winners or relative to those with no possibility of a gain). | [[papers:​Commitments To Give If You Win Exceed Donations After A Win |(Kellner ea, '17)]] | | [[tools:​Give if you win|Give if you win]] | <popover content="​When do you ask for donations and commitments?​ From what sources of income (regular income, bonuses, tax refunds...)?​ Do you ask for commitments that are *conditional* on certain outcomes? When will the pledged donations actually be made, and with what pattern over time?" trigger='​hover'>​Timing/​conditionality,​ income source</​popover>​ | Ask for *conditional* commitments from uncertain unrealized income. E.g., ask "if you get a raise next year, would you donate 10%  of your salary increase?" ​ This can be a nonbinding pledge you're reminded of, or a more formal commitment. (See giveifyouwin.org.) | People facing uncertain gains donate more if asked to donate in advance, conditionally on positive outcome. Also, people who have just failed to win a bonus are particularly unlikely to donate (relative to winners or relative to those with no possibility of a gain). | [[papers:​Commitments To Give If You Win Exceed Donations After A Win |(Kellner ea, '17)]] |
-| [[tools:​Precover overhead costs|Pre-cover overhead costs]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | A third party (large donor, organization,​ etc) may agree that they will pay all of the "​overhead costs" for a charity or project. ​ Later potential donors ​ can then be told that the full amount of their gift will go towards "​program activities"​. (However, defining "​overhead" ​ is tricky.) | Using a lead donor funds to "cover overhead"​ increases donation incidence and amounts; more effective than match or seed. | [[papers:​Avoiding Overhead Aversion In Charity|(Gneezy ea, '14)]], [[papers:​Are Overhead Costs A Good Guide For Charitable Giving|(Meer,​ '17)]] |+| [[tools:​Precover overhead costs|Pre-cover overhead costs]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | A third party (large donor, organization,​ etc) may agree that they will pay all of the "​overhead costs" for a charity or project. ​ Later potential donors ​ can then be told that the full amount of their gift will go towards "​program activities"​. (However, defining "​overhead" ​ is tricky.) | Using a lead donor funds to "cover overhead"​ increases donation incidence and amounts; more effective than match or seed. | [[papers:​Avoiding Overhead Aversion In Charity|(Gneezy ea, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Charities collaboratecompete|Charities collaborate/​compete?​]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | When people get appeals for one charity, and respond by donating, ​ this may make them less likely to donate to other charities. If charities are thus in competition,​ but they share similar ultimate goals, they may do better in net by limiting and coordinating their fundraising activities. | Mixed evidence on whether a charitable ask or incentive for one charity reduces donations to other charities. Estimates range from zero to complete crowding-out. For similar charities?, esp for larger givers;? for  those offered matches; for repeated asks.  Specific appeals/​tools have been found to increase *overall* giving (and not be completely crowded out). In other studies a complete '​time-shifting'​ effect cannot be ruled out, but these are often underpowered. | [[papers:Do Charities Get More When They Ask More Often Evidence From A Unique Field Experiment|(Donkers ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does Irritation Induced By Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations|(Diepen ea, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Lift And Shift The Effect Of Fundraising Interventions In Charity Space And Time|(Scharf ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does One Charitable Contribution Come At The Expense Of Another|(Reinstein,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:​Does Fundraising Create New Giving|(Meer,​ '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Demand For Giving To Multiple Charities An Experimental Study|(Filiz-Ozbay & U, '​18)]],​ [[papers:​Substitution Effects Across Charitable Donations|(Cairns & S, '11)]] | | [[tools:​Charities collaboratecompete|Charities collaborate/​compete?​]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | When people get appeals for one charity, and respond by donating, ​ this may make them less likely to donate to other charities. If charities are thus in competition,​ but they share similar ultimate goals, they may do better in net by limiting and coordinating their fundraising activities. | Mixed evidence on whether a charitable ask or incentive for one charity reduces donations to other charities. Estimates range from zero to complete crowding-out. For similar charities?, esp for larger givers;? for  those offered matches; for repeated asks.  Specific appeals/​tools have been found to increase *overall* giving (and not be completely crowded out). In other studies a complete '​time-shifting'​ effect cannot be ruled out, but these are often underpowered. | [[papers:Do Charities Get More When They Ask More Often Evidence From A Unique Field Experiment|(Donkers ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does Irritation Induced By Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations|(Diepen ea, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Lift And Shift The Effect Of Fundraising Interventions In Charity Space And Time|(Scharf ea, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Does One Charitable Contribution Come At The Expense Of Another|(Reinstein,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:​Does Fundraising Create New Giving|(Meer,​ '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Demand For Giving To Multiple Charities An Experimental Study|(Filiz-Ozbay & U, '​18)]],​ [[papers:​Substitution Effects Across Charitable Donations|(Cairns & S, '11)]] |
 | [[tools:​Askerdonor connection|Asker-donor connection]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Fundraisers ​ could choose solicitors who have a particular connection with potential donors (e.g., from  same university or geographic area), ​ and emphasize this connection. | "When a college roommate calls to ask for a donation to the alma mater, both the likelihood and amount of giving rise significantly."​ | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '11)]] | | [[tools:​Askerdonor connection|Asker-donor connection]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Fundraisers ​ could choose solicitors who have a particular connection with potential donors (e.g., from  same university or geographic area), ​ and emphasize this connection. | "When a college roommate calls to ask for a donation to the alma mater, both the likelihood and amount of giving rise significantly."​ | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '11)]] |
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 | [[tools:​Contingent match|Contingent match]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | Large donors (for example) might agree to match all donations made if a particular threshold is reached, or if there is a particular response rate (share of people who donate). | One paper finds that a match contingent on a 75% participation rate was more effective than a standard match and also more effective than no match. | [[papers:​Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations|(Anik ea, '14)]] | | [[tools:​Contingent match|Contingent match]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | Large donors (for example) might agree to match all donations made if a particular threshold is reached, or if there is a particular response rate (share of people who donate). | One paper finds that a match contingent on a 75% participation rate was more effective than a standard match and also more effective than no match. | [[papers:​Contingent Match Incentives Increase Donations|(Anik ea, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Info on recipients deservingness|Info on recipients'​ deservingness]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A fundraiser could give donors information about a particular charity beneficiary (e.g., a homeless person). Donors might use this to determine whether a recipient is deserving of help. | "​Dictators [charitable giving] who acquire information mostly use it to withhold resources from less-preferred types, leading to a drastic decline in aggregate transfers";​ however, there are selection effects. The exogenous provision of information seems to increase donations overall. | [[papers:​Truth In Giving Experimental Evidence On The Welfare Effects Of Informed Giving To The Poor|(Fong & O, '11)]] | | [[tools:​Info on recipients deservingness|Info on recipients'​ deservingness]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A fundraiser could give donors information about a particular charity beneficiary (e.g., a homeless person). Donors might use this to determine whether a recipient is deserving of help. | "​Dictators [charitable giving] who acquire information mostly use it to withhold resources from less-preferred types, leading to a drastic decline in aggregate transfers";​ however, there are selection effects. The exogenous provision of information seems to increase donations overall. | [[papers:​Truth In Giving Experimental Evidence On The Welfare Effects Of Informed Giving To The Poor|(Fong & O, '11)]] |
-| [[tools:​Individualidentifiable victim|Individual/​identifiable victim]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Presenting a single person ​ who will benefit from the charitable donation; ​ rather than presenting a larger group, a vague  on identifiable ​beneficiary,​ or presenting statistics | Portray ​an individual (child) raises more than conveying the total number affected. It also raises more than portraying multiple individuals. | [[papers:Helping A Victim Or Helping The Victim Altruism And Identifiability|(Small & L, '03)]], [[papers:​The Identifiable Victim Effect ​Causes And Boundary Conditions|(Kogut R, '11)]], [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)a]] |+| [[tools:​Individualidentifiable victim|Individual/​identifiable victim]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | Presenting a single person ​ who will benefit from the charitable donation; ​ rather than presenting a larger group, a vague unidentifiable ​beneficiary,​ or presenting statistics | Portraying ​an individual (child) raises more than conveying the total number affected. It also raises more than portraying multiple individuals. | [[papers:Argumentinconsistency in charity appeals Statistical information about the scope of the problem decrease helping toward a single identified victim but not helping toward many nonidentified victims in a refugee crisis context|(Erlandsson ea, '16)]], [[papers:​The Identifiable Victim Effect ​A MetaAnalytic Review|(Lee F, '16)]], [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '07)a]], [[papers:​The Identifiable Victim Effect Causes And Boundary Conditions|(Kogut & R, '​11)]],​ [[papers:​Helping A Victim Or Helping The Victim Altruism And Identifiability|(Small & L, '03)]] |
 | [[tools:​Unconditional gift|Unconditional gift]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | Charities or fundraisers may offer a gift to potential donors that  they can keep whether or not they donate. ​ For example, a charity for African development projects may include ​ a small beaded necklace crafted in the villages they  are supporting along with each solicitation mailing. | Giving a small gift to potential donors increases giving. | [[papers:​Gift Exchange In The Field|(Falk,​ '07)]] | | [[tools:​Unconditional gift|Unconditional gift]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | Charities or fundraisers may offer a gift to potential donors that  they can keep whether or not they donate. ​ For example, a charity for African development projects may include ​ a small beaded necklace crafted in the villages they  are supporting along with each solicitation mailing. | Giving a small gift to potential donors increases giving. | [[papers:​Gift Exchange In The Field|(Falk,​ '07)]] |
 | [[tools:​Pledgingprecommitment|Pledging/​precommitment]] | <popover content="​How much to ask for, what do you suggest people donate, how do you frame this, etc..."​ trigger='​hover'>​Choice architecture,​ size/nature of ask</​popover>​ | Ask for a pledge or promised commitment to donate (a particular amount, or in general) before making the *actual* ask requiring the actual commitment of money. |  | [[papers:​Promises undone How committed pledges impact donations to charity|(Fosgaard & A, '18)]] | | [[tools:​Pledgingprecommitment|Pledging/​precommitment]] | <popover content="​How much to ask for, what do you suggest people donate, how do you frame this, etc..."​ trigger='​hover'>​Choice architecture,​ size/nature of ask</​popover>​ | Ask for a pledge or promised commitment to donate (a particular amount, or in general) before making the *actual* ask requiring the actual commitment of money. |  | [[papers:​Promises undone How committed pledges impact donations to charity|(Fosgaard & A, '18)]] |
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 | [[tools:​Teach Identifiable victims bias|Teach "​Identifiable victims bias"​]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A fundraiser can explain that people do tend to donate more to a single "​identifiable victim"​ than to "​statistical victims" ​ or large groups. One might imagine that this  "​de-biasing" ​ would make them more responsive to statistical information ​ about effectiveness and the magnitude of a problem. | Small et al. (2007): teaching people about the '​identifiable victim bias' reduced donations towards identifiable victims, but did not increase giving to statistical victims (significant interaction). ​ Kogut & R, '05b: When given *choices* between identified individual and identified group, people often choose the latter. | [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)a]],​ [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)b]] | | [[tools:​Teach Identifiable victims bias|Teach "​Identifiable victims bias"​]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A fundraiser can explain that people do tend to donate more to a single "​identifiable victim"​ than to "​statistical victims" ​ or large groups. One might imagine that this  "​de-biasing" ​ would make them more responsive to statistical information ​ about effectiveness and the magnitude of a problem. | Small et al. (2007): teaching people about the '​identifiable victim bias' reduced donations towards identifiable victims, but did not increase giving to statistical victims (significant interaction). ​ Kogut & R, '05b: When given *choices* between identified individual and identified group, people often choose the latter. | [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)a]],​ [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)b]] |
 | [[tools:​Seed donations|Seed donations]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | An external source (large donor, foundation, or government) may make a large  initial donation towards the project, and this can be announced to later potential donors. | (More) seed money increases donations (propensity,​ amounts) in some studies. Increased '​proximity to a goal' seems to increase donations. | [[papers:​Matched Fundraising Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment|(Huck & R, '​11)]],​ [[papers:​The Effects Of Seed Money And Refunds On Charitable Giving Experimental Evidence From A University Capital Campaign|(List & L, '02)]] | | [[tools:​Seed donations|Seed donations]] | <popover content="​Material inducements to donate (or things that could be perceived as such). Various types of rewards for (potential) donors."​ trigger='​hover'>​Incentives/​gifts</​popover>​ | An external source (large donor, foundation, or government) may make a large  initial donation towards the project, and this can be announced to later potential donors. | (More) seed money increases donations (propensity,​ amounts) in some studies. Increased '​proximity to a goal' seems to increase donations. | [[papers:​Matched Fundraising Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment|(Huck & R, '​11)]],​ [[papers:​The Effects Of Seed Money And Refunds On Charitable Giving Experimental Evidence From A University Capital Campaign|(List & L, '02)]] |
-| [[tools:​Reveal previous donations|Reveal previous donations]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | Tell potential donors about previous individual or average contributions; ​ perhaps report selectively to make these seem particularly large. Donors ​ may respond by giving more when they hear of larger previous donations. | Revealing larger previous donations (in a range) increases giving; larger targets can be ineffective | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:A Field Experiment In Charitable Contribution The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods|(Shang & C, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Anonymity Reciprocity And Conformity Evidence From Voluntary Contributions To A National Park In Costa Rica|(Alpizar ea, '​08)]],​ [[papers:​Social Comparisons And ProSocial Behavior Testing ​Textquotedblleftconditional Cooperationtextquotedblright ​In A Field Experiment|(Frey & M, '​04)]],​ [[papers:​How Is Donation Behaviour Affected By The Donations Of Others|(Martin & R, '​08)]],​ [[papers:​Peer Effects In Charitable Giving Evidence From The Running Field|(Smith ea, '14)]] |+| [[tools:​Reveal previous donations|Reveal previous donations]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | Tell potential donors about previous individual or average contributions; ​ perhaps report selectively to make these seem particularly large. Donors ​ may respond by giving more when they hear of larger previous donations. | Revealing larger previous donations (in a range) increases giving; larger targets can be ineffective | [[papers:​Brother Can You Spare A Dime Peer Pressure In Charitable Solicitation|(Meer,​ '​11)]],​ [[papers:A Field Experiment In Charitable Contribution The Impact Of Social Information On The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods|(Shang & C, '​09)]],​ [[papers:​Anonymity Reciprocity And Conformity Evidence From Voluntary Contributions To A National Park In Costa Rica|(Alpizar ea, '​08)]],​ [[papers:​Social Comparisons And ProSocial Behavior Testing ​conditional Cooperation ​In A Field Experiment|(Frey & M, '​04)]],​ [[papers:​How Is Donation Behaviour Affected By The Donations Of Others|(Martin & R, '​08)]],​ [[papers:​Peer Effects In Charitable Giving Evidence From The Running Field|(Smith ea, '14)]] |
 | [[tools:​Visibilitypublicity|Visibility/​publicity]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | Publicize (larger) donations and the donors, make these visible to other donors automatically or by default (allowing opt-out); ​ make this natural and encourage this. | Varied evidence that people '​sometimes'​ donate more when donations are visible (esp males) or when told of recognition possibility;​ larger amounts (Alpizar ea) | [[papers:​The Prestige Motive For Making Charitable Transfers|(Harbaugh,​ '​98)]],​ [[papers:​Anonymity In Giving In A Natural ContextA Field Experiment In 30 Churches|(Soetevent,​ '05)]] | | [[tools:​Visibilitypublicity|Visibility/​publicity]] | <popover content="​Involving networks of friends, family, colleagues, peers; sharing information about donations in various ways; community activities"​ trigger='​hover'>​Social</​popover>​ | Publicize (larger) donations and the donors, make these visible to other donors automatically or by default (allowing opt-out); ​ make this natural and encourage this. | Varied evidence that people '​sometimes'​ donate more when donations are visible (esp males) or when told of recognition possibility;​ larger amounts (Alpizar ea) | [[papers:​The Prestige Motive For Making Charitable Transfers|(Harbaugh,​ '​98)]],​ [[papers:​Anonymity In Giving In A Natural ContextA Field Experiment In 30 Churches|(Soetevent,​ '05)]] |
 | [[tools:​Impact per  info|"​Impact"​ (per $) info]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A charity, fundraiser or site could present information on how effective/​impactful it is,  in terms of the amount of "final outcome" ​ it achieves per dollar donated, or equivalently, ​ the cost per unit of this outcome achieved. ​ E.g., the Against Malaria Foundation could report GiveWell'​s asessment that for every $3280 donated, one life is saved, on average. Loosely speaking, according to the Effective Altruism movement, this should be the donor'​s critical concern in choosing a charity. | Karlan and Wood (2017): adding scientific impact info (including some quantitative information;​ and removing emotional stimulus in part) had a small/​insignificant net effect: increased gifts from large prior donors, reduced gifts from small prior donors. | [[papers:​The Effect Of Effectiveness Donor Response To Aid Effectiveness In A Direct Mail Fundraising Experiment|(Karlan & W, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)b]] | | [[tools:​Impact per  info|"​Impact"​ (per $) info]] | <popover content="​Providing factual information,​ as well as emotional and descriptive material... ​ on the charity, it's work, the cause, the beneficiaries,​ other donors, it's effectiveness and efficiency, etc." trigger='​hover'>​Info/​communications</​popover>​ | A charity, fundraiser or site could present information on how effective/​impactful it is,  in terms of the amount of "final outcome" ​ it achieves per dollar donated, or equivalently, ​ the cost per unit of this outcome achieved. ​ E.g., the Against Malaria Foundation could report GiveWell'​s asessment that for every $3280 donated, one life is saved, on average. Loosely speaking, according to the Effective Altruism movement, this should be the donor'​s critical concern in choosing a charity. | Karlan and Wood (2017): adding scientific impact info (including some quantitative information;​ and removing emotional stimulus in part) had a small/​insignificant net effect: increased gifts from large prior donors, reduced gifts from small prior donors. | [[papers:​The Effect Of Effectiveness Donor Response To Aid Effectiveness In A Direct Mail Fundraising Experiment|(Karlan & W, '​17)]],​ [[papers:​Sympathy And Callousness The Impact Of Deliberative Thought On Donations To Identifiable And Statistical Victims|(Small ea, '​07)b]] |
  
  • tables/tools.txt
  • Last modified: 2019/03/16 23:00
  • by katja