Reference Title Type of evidence Discussion Tools Link
(Yoruk, '16) Charity Ratings Causal-observational (IV etc) Quality ratings
(Fraser ea, '89) The effect of matching contribution offers and legitimization of paltry contributions on compliance Field-exp-charity Abstract > The use of a matching contribution offer in conjunction with legitimization of paltry contributions is examined in a door-to-door charitable solicitation context. Three hundred and twenty households were exposed to charitable contribution requests employing either legitimization of paltry contributions, a matching contribution offer, both, or a control. It was predicted that the matching funds offer, paired with legitimization of paltry donations, would increase both compliance rates and donation sizes and generate greater revenues than either tactic used singly. The results of a field experiment support this prediction. Ask for *small* donation Full text
(Yoruk, '09) How responsive are charitable donors to requests to give? Personal ask
(Gneezy ea, '17) Do I care if you are paid? A field experiment on charitable donations Field-exp-charity Solicitor characteristics Full text
(Chang & L, '09) Framing charity advertising: Influences of message framing, image valence, and temporal framing on a charitable appeal Hypothetical/intentional experiment Negative/positive framing Full text
(Carpenter ea, '08) Charity auctions: a field experiment* (All-pay) Auctions
(Sanders, '16) Social Influences on Charitable Giving in the Workplace Field-exp-charity Personalisation Full text
(Sudhir ea, '16) Do Sympathy Biases Induce Charitable Giving? The Effects of Advertising Content Individual/identifiable victim, Negative/positive framing Full text
(Reinstein & R, '12) Reputation and influence in charitable giving: An experiment Revelation - gender mediator
(Small & L, '03) Helping a victim or helping the victim: Altruism and identifiability Correlational-observational Individual/identifiable victim Full text
(Karlan and L, '14) How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People' s Donations to Fund Public Goods ? Working Paper 292 April 2012
(Falk, '07) Gift exchange in the field Field-exp-charity Unconditional gift Full text
(Anik ea, '14) Contingent match incentives increase donations In spite of title, the results seem mixed/underpowered perhaps? Contingent match Full text
(Eckel & G, '08) Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies Field-exp-charity "Matching" (vs rebates)
(Chuan & S, '14) Feel the Warmth’” Glow: A Field Experiment on Manipulating the Act of Giving Ideas42: > In a door-to-door fundraising campaign (n = 1,536), volunteers asked households to support a local charity that provides blankets to families in need. Solicitors explained that holiday cards would accompany the blankets funded by donors. They told the control group that cards had been pre-written, but gave the treatment group the option of writing messages. Contrary to the researchers’ hypothesis, households in the treatment group were 20% less likely to donate. They conclude that the opportunity to write a card may drive up the cost of giving in multiple ways: 1) more social pressure to accompany the personal gesture with a larger gift amount, 2) increased time to complete a transaction, and/or 3) additional need to make two decisions – whether to give, and whether to write a card – rather than one (Chuan and Samak 2013). Reduce transaction costs
(Small ea, '07; first part) Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims [Focus: studies 1-2] Study 1: Explicit debiasing (teaching about the ID victims effect) significantly reduced giving to identifiable victims, and find significant difference from the effect on giving to statistical victims. (Latter effect positive, insignificant; bounds?) Study 2: Tests whether this is driven by more/less frame; but is this test powerful enough? Further results on emotional mediators/channels Effectiveness info: deliberation
(Eckel & G, '03) Rebate versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter? Lab-charity "Matching" (vs rebates) Full text
(Andreoni ea, '17) Avoiding the ask: A field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving Field-exp-charity Ideas42: > In a randomized natural field experiment (n = 8,831), Salvation Army solicitors were stationed sometimes at one and sometimes at both of two main entrances to a supermarket. This gave some shoppers an easy way to avoid requests to donate. Solicitors were either silent and simply rang a bell as shoppers passed or made eye contact and asked shoppers to “please give today”. Researchers found that verbally asking people to give dramatically raised participation rates and increased the total amount donated by more than 50%. However, the direct ask also led a third of shoppers to avoid solicitors altogether by using other entrances. Evidence suggests that “avoiders” are shielding themselves from emotion-based impulses to give and the guilt associated with not giving, revealing a sophisticated understanding of empathy and altruism rather than callousness or selfishness Info on recipients' deservingness Full text
(Karlan & W, '07) The effect of effectiveness: Donor response to aid effectiveness in a direct mail fundraising experiment Field-exp-charity First wave treatment was an non-numerical indicator of the method's credibility: > “According to studies on our programs in Peru that used rigorous scientific methodologies, women who have received both loans and business education saw their profits grow”; in first wave the strong emotional appeal was present for both control and treatment. The second wave treatment was quantitative > That is why we have coordinated with independent researchers [at Yale University] to conduct scientifically rigorous impact studies of our programs.In Peru they found that women who were offered our Credit with Education program had 16% higher profits in their businesses than those who were not, and they increased profits in bad months by 27%! … and it also *removed* the emotional component (for the treatment, retained for the control). They report the *net* effect of both treatments. A re-analysis of the raw data could be very helpful. <airtable:mention id=“menk4OzwZMtIepN5z”>@Alexis Carlier</airtable:mention>  Effectiveness info: deliberation, "Impact" (per $) info Full text
(Landry ea, '10) Is a donor in hand better than two in the bush? Evidence from a natural field experiment Field-exp-charity Quality ratings, Solicitor characteristics, Gift for donors Full text
(Chao, '17) Demotivating incentives and motivation crowding out in charitable giving Field-exp-charity Thank you notes/gifts Full text
(Alpizar ea, 2008) Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica Field-exp-charity Reveal previous donations Full text
(Kogut & R, '17) Helping an Outgroup Member Or the Outgroup: The Identifiability Effect in an Intergroup Context Individual/identifiable victim
(Chao, '17) Demotivating incentives and motivation crowding out in charitable giving Field-exp-charity Gift for donors
(Samek & S, '15) Selective Recognition: How to Recognize Donors to Increase Charitable Giving Lab-charity
(Breman, '11) Give more tomorrow: Two field experiments on altruism and intertemporal choice Field-exp-charity Give more tomorrow Full text
(Martin & M, '06) How is donation behaviour affected by the donations of others ? ∗ Field-exp-charity Reveal previous donations Full text
(Metzger & G, '15) Making an impact? The relevance of information on aid effectiveness for charitable giving. A laboratory experiment. Lab-charity > …the demand for information about aid impact is lowest, and it is highest for information about the recipient type [Note: the latter would seem to also be a possible effectiveness measure!] > … exact information about aid impact did not lead to a significant change in average donation levels, while information about the exact recipient type and administrative costs led to a significant change in donation levels. > In the recipient type group, informed participants donated significantly more than uninformed participants because they “rewarded” the preferred recipient with higher-than-average transfers. In the administration costs group, informed participants donated significantly less than uninformed participants because they used the information to “punish” NGOs with high administration costs "Impact" (per $) info
(Goswami & U, '16) When Should the Ask be a Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations” Default/suggested contribution
(Null, '11) Warm glow, information, and inefficient charitable giving Lab-charity Why donors give to multiple charities is a bit of a puzzle; given most people's small contributions, the effectiveness of each charity is not likely to diminish in their contribution; thus one charity is likely to be the most effective. People may be exactly indifferent between these, perceiving them to yield the same marginal benefit. If this were the case, lowering the price (increasing the matching rate) for one of these charities should get them to shift all their donation to that charity. However, participants in this experiment shift the donations only somewhat in response to this, which could be attributed to a form of “risk aversion” over the charity's impact, or a version of “warm glow” (with a diminishing marginal warm glow in the amount given to each charity). Introducing exogenous risks over matching rates … roughly 2/3 of those that choose to shift only imperfectly are not measured to be “risk averse”. Her experiments were run both at Kiwanis/Rotary clubs and with “professional subjects” (university administrators?) at the Berkeley X-lab; the former strictly involved allocations *among* charities, in the latter case what was not given away could be kept. For the main reported treatments, participants made a series of decisions under different incentives (mostly on the same pages and thus simultaneously?). The “prize” was $100; in each session only one decision from one subject was chosen. Null includes an experiment on “donor control” in the same paper, which is fairly distinct (we will report this separately). Abstract > … revealed preference data from a lab experiment in which more than 200 real-world donors decide how to divide a gift between a charity they currently support and a set of international development charities. Most subjects simultaneously give to multiple development charities that have similar mission statements. This is true even when the social benefit of gifts, proxied by the matching rates received by the charities, are not equal. … Subjects forfeited social surplus (matching funds) equal to 25% of the value of their gifts. … Few subjects were willing to pay for information that could have enabled them to increase the social benefit of their gifts. > By exogenously varying the marginal social benefit of a gift and the risk associated with this marginal social benefit, my experimental design allows me to distinguish subjects who give to multiple charities because they are perfect substitutes from those who split their gifts ineficiently, and to identify the source of these ineficiencies as either being attributable to warm glow or risk aversion. > When they were told the distribution of matching rates but not how the rates would be assigned to charities, only 40% of subjects were willing to give up a small portion of their endowments in order to nd out which charity would receive the highest rate; the rest preferred to allocate their gifts without knowing what they would be worth to the charities. Give donor control
(Diepen ea, '09) Does irritation induced by charitable direct mailings reduce donations ? Field-exp-charity > Our analysis reveals that direct mailings do result in irritation, but surprisingly, this irritation affects neither stated nor actual donating behavior. Charities collaborate/compete? Full text
(Donkers ea, '17) Do charities get more when they ask more often ? Evidence from a unique field experiment Field-exp-charity Evidence for “cannibalization” of own mailings, some competitive effect on other charities in the short run; underpowered to detect long-run competitive effects Charities collaborate/compete?
(Dyck & C, '92) Using Positive vs. Negative Photographs for Third-World Fund Raising Field-exp-charity Negative/positive framing Full text
(Fong & O, '10) Truth in giving: Experimental evidence on the welfare effects of informed giving to the poor Info on recipients' deservingness Full text
(Rasul & H, '10) Transactions Costs in Charitable Giving: Evidence from Two Field Experiments Field-exp-charity “Huck and Rasul conduct two experiments. In the first they assume that subjects who did not respond to an initial postal request to donate, but did respond to a reminder, responded to the reminder because it triggered a new draw from the same distribution of transaction costs (e.g., perhaps they were not as busy when the reminder letter arrived). There were a significant number of responses to the reminder letter, which Huck and Rasul argue implies the presence of transaction costs. … In Huck and Rasul's second experiment a solicitation letter is sent out for a separate fund raiser. Different treatments provide different payment options (a bank transfer versus a pre-filled bank transfer form or paying by credit card over the phone). When the transaction costs of donating were lower, the response rate was higher, but mean donations were not significantly different.” (summary in Knowles & S, 2015) Reduce transaction costs
(Kessler & M, '14) Identity in Charitable Giving
(Onderstal ea, '13) Bidding to Give in the Field Field-exp-charity (All-pay) Auctions, Lotteries/raffles Full text
(Frey & M, '04) Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior : Testing in a Field Experiment “ Conditional Cooperation ” Field-exp-charity Reveal previous donations Full text
(Ek, 2017) Some Causes are More Equal than Others? The Effect of Similarity on Substitution in Charitable Giving Lab-charity > AIn an experimental dictator game where subjects may donate [via real effort] to two different real-world charities, we simulate activity-specific interventions by varying the relative productivity of those charities, and introduce several treatments to test whether (i) subjects substitute across charities, and (ii) whether substitution occurs even across (possibly very) dissimilar alternatives. We find that significant substitution occurs in all cases, but that the effect is weaker the more dissimilar the charity alternatives. In our most dissimilar treatment, substitution is only half as large as when alternatives are very similar. Charities collaborate/compete?
(Newman & S, '12) The counterintuitive effects of thank-you gifts on charitable giving Field-exp-charity Thank you notes/gifts Full text
(Shang & C, '09) Field Experiments in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Influence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods Field-exp-charity Abstract > We study the effect of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. Competing theories predict that others’ contributions might be either substitutes or complements to one's own. We demonstrate a positive social information effect on individual contributions, supporting theories of complementarities. We find the most influential level of social information is drawn from the 90th to 95th percentile of previous contributions. We furthermore find the effect to be significant for new members but not for renewing members. In the most effective condition, social information increases contributions by 12% ($13). These increased contributions do not crowd out future contributions. Reveal previous donations Full text
(Adena & H, '17) Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment Lab-charity (quoting “Highlights”) > Matching donations, while common in practice, has been shown to cause partial crowding out. > Simple theoretical considerations suggest that using matching funds for an alternative project may improve outcomes. > Crowding out will be reduced if the second project is a substitute to the first and even more if it is a complement. > Results from a field experiment indicate that crowding out can be reduced if matching funds are used for an alternative project. > Our laboratory experiment further confirms the superior performance of using matching funds for a complementary project.
(Kogut & R, '05b) The singularity effect of identified victims in separate and joint evaluations Teach "Identifiable victims bias"
(Damgaard & G, '17) Now or never! The effect of deadlines on charitable giving: Evidence from two natural field experiments Deadlines
(List & L, '02) The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign Seed donations Full text
(Ozbay & U, '17) Demand for Giving to Multiple Charities: An Experimental Study Lab-charity > Our theory predicts that an increase in the rebate rate offered by a given charity relative to a substitute charity will shift donations away from the substitute charity, but this “stealing” effect is not expected when complementary charities are considered. … experimental results support our theoretical predictions. Charities collaborate/compete? Full text
(Scharf ea, '17) Lift and Shift: The Effect of Fundraising Interventions in Charity Space and Time Causal-observational (IV etc) - Data from Charities Aid Foundation, 130,000 individual charity accounts, 2009-2014; covers 6 major disasters - Increase in giving after disaster appeal, no reduced giving to international relief later on - 'Fail to reject zero substitution' of all other charity, with 'precisely estimated' effects - Time-shifting: Giving to *all* charities, even unrelated ones, increase in the 5 weeks after disaster, but decrease in weeks 6-13 Charities collaborate/compete?
(Deryugina & M, '15) Do Causes Crowd Each Other Out? Evidence from Tornado Strikes Causal-observational (IV etc) Result: Donations in a state affected by a tornado (causing 10+ injuries) increase by 1.7-2\% in that year and 1.9-2\% percent in the 2 years after They argue that this is evidence against (complete) crowding out Charities collaborate/compete? Full text
(Damgaard ea, '18) The hidden costs of nudging: Experimental evidence from reminders in fundraising Field-exp-charity Nudging backfire (caution) Full text
(Zagefka & James, 2015) “The Psychology of Charitable Donations to Disaster Victims and Beyond” Meta-analysis/lit survey Full text
(Berman ea, '15) Impediments to Effective Altruism: The Role of Subjective Preferences in Charitable Giving Hypothetical/intentional experiment Abstract: > We found that even when effectiveness information is made easily comparable across options, it has a limited impact on choice. Specifically, people frequently choose less effective charity options when those options represent more subjectively preferred causes. In contrast to making a personal donation decision, outcome metrics are used to a much greater extent when choosing financial investments and when allocating aid resources as an agent of an organization Note: these are all *hypothetical* choices. This paper extends previous research on how people “appear to be -distorted altruists— they care about welfare maximization, but without clear information to make comparisons, they rely on their feelings to guide choice (Loewenstein & Small, 2007; Slovic, 2007)”. The novelty here is the use of “effectiveness information is provided across multiple different causes” rather than a single cause. Their main theoretical characterization of their results: > …individuals view charity as a relatively subjective decision … believing that charity is a subjective decision licenses individuals to donate in personally gratifying ways at the cost of maximizing welfare Summary of results ——————- Note, all studies use behavioral lab/students or Mturkers; all decisions are hypothetical. Study 1: Perceived Subjectivity of Charity – In rating statements (1-7 likert) like “It is important that the I choose reflects my personal tastes or values” vs “It is more important to rely on objective measures rather than personal feelings when choosing“ … they agreed more with the *subjective/taste* approach for charity relative to choosing investments, cel phones, or (marginally) restaurants, but less so than for a piece of art. Study 2: Personal Feelings Versus Welfare Gains – ” When participants read that Mary felt an emotional connection with distant charities, they responded that she should donate to Hunger Care in Africa (M = 5.26, SD = 2.05) and also evaluated it as being more effective (M = 5.59, SD = 1.87), t(197) = -1.19, p = .24, d = −0.17, 95% CI = [−0.44, 0.11]. However, when Mary felt connected to local communities, they indicated that she should donate to Jump Start Your Community (M = 3.00, SD = 1.99), despite indicating that Hunger Care in Africa was more effective (M = 4.55, SD = 2.32), t(202) = -5.12, p < .001, d = −0.72, 95% CI = [-1.00, −0.43].“ - but note that Mary's connection to the charity also affects the stated “effectiveness” response! Study 3: Charity Versus Investment Choice: Subjects assigned categories and fictional examples of either charities or investment, and told their domain category and effectiveness. Asked to sort these [how justified?], “significantly fewer participants chose to sort by effectiveness rating in the charity condition (67.8%) than in the investment condition (83.4%), -2 (1, N = 401) = 13.20, p < .001, - = .1” “Significantly fewer participants chose the highest rated option in the charity condition (32.2%) than in the investment condition (50.3%), -2 (1, N = 401) = 13.52, p < .001, - = .1” Study 4: Decision-Making Role and Welfare Maximization 2×2 – Participants given a “donor condition” or a “president of a local medical research center” condition and were [not] given effectiveness ratings for each “department (arthritis = 92, heart disease = 86, cancer = 74). … selected so that the most intuitively appealing choice was rated as the least effective (cancer)” “Results revealed a significant Role - Effectiveness Ratings interaction”; the effectiveness information had a positive impact for both, but a larger one in the “president” scenario [But is this specific scenario comparison s relevant to charities; hospital president has a distinct role, and this was a choice essentially within the *same* charity] Study 5: Judgments of Decision Quality Similar setup as study 4, but subjects assess the (“percieved”) “decision quality” and “altruism”. Analogous results to study 4 for both. [The altruism result is puzzling: what justifies this? Are they answering these questions carefully?] "Impact" (per $) info
(Gneezy ea, '14) Avoiding overhead aversion in charity Field-exp-charity Pre-cover overhead costs Full text
(List & L, '02) The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign Field-exp-charity Abstract: > We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund-raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced “seed money” will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold increase in contributions, with significant effects on both participation rates and average gift size. Imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20 percent, with significant effects on average gift size. Refund donations if target not reached, Seed donations Full text
(Li EA, '11) Giving to government: Voluntary taxation in the lab
(Soetevent, '05) Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context: An Economic Field Experiment in Thirty Churches Visibility/publicity Full text
(Cialdini & S, '76) Increasing compliance by legitimizing paltry contributions: When even a penny helps. Ask for *small* donation Full text
(Kogut & R, '05) The “identified victim” effect: An identified group, or just a single individual? Lab-charity Teach "Identifiable victims bias" Full text
(Rondeau & L, '08) Matching and Challenge Gifts to Charity: Evidence from Laboratory and Natural Field Experiments Lab-charity ”…direct mail fundraising campaign for the Sierra Club (n = 3,000) in which some letters described a match offer, with every dollar in donations later matched by a dollar from a lead donor. In other letters, researchers referenced a “challenge gift” already contributed by a lead donor. Mentioning a challenge gift increased participation rates by 23% and total contributions by 18%, compared to a plain ask. The challenge gift also outperformed the amount raised under the match offer by 31% (Rondeau and List 2008).“ (ideas42) Seed donations Full text
(UK BIT, '2013) Applying behavioural insights to charitable giving “Many of our customers like to leave money to charity in their will. Are there any causes you are passionate about?” …“Clients in the second group were 43% more likely to participate in legacy giving.” Auto-index
(Andreoni & P, '11) Is crowding out due entirely to fundraising? Evidence from a panel of charities Economic theory
(Huck & R, '11) Matched fundraising: Evidence from a natural field experiment Field-exp-charity Offer a matching donation, Seed donations Full text
(Kogut & R, '11) The identifiable victim effect: Causes and boundary conditions Individual/identifiable victim Full text
(Oppenheimer & O, 2011) The Science of Giving, Introduction
(Small ea, '07) Sympathy and callousness: The impact of deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims [Focus: studies 3-4] Study 3: “individuals who faced an identifiable victim donated more than those who faced victim statistics, p < .01, and also donated more than those who faced an identifiable victim in conjunction with statistics, p < .05.” Study 4: ” Priming analytic thinking reduced donations to an identifiable victim relative to a feeling-based thinking prime. Yet, the primes had no distinct effect on donations to statistical victims, which is symptomatic of the difficulty in generating feelings for these victims.” [Note that the latter non-effect appears tightly bounded.] Further results on emotional mediators/channels Ideas42: > Researchers gave study participants the opportunity to donate $0-5 to famine relief efforts at Save the Children (n = 159). One group received letters that included a picture and brief description of a little girl. A second group received letters describing factual information about food security, and a third group received letters with both the little girl’s profile and factual information. The photo and description prompted an emotion-based response, raising more than twice as much money as the factual solicitation. Including factual information with the girl’s profile reduced this effect, with no significant difference in giving between those who received both pieces and those who received factual information only Effectiveness info: deliberation
(Castillo ea, '14) Fundraising through online social networks: A field experiment on peer-to-peer solicitation
(Andreoni & S, '16) Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving * Lab-charity Thank you notes/gifts
(Kraut, '73) Effects of Social Labeling on Giving to Charity
(Karlan & M '14) Hey look at me: The effect of giving circles on giving Field-exp-charity Visibility/publicity Full text
(Exley, '16b) Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk Lab-charity Avoid uncertainties/excuses
(Harbaugh, '98) The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers Visibility/publicity, Recognition tiers Full text
(Fetherstonhaugh ea '97) Insensitivity to the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing. Hypothetical/intentional experiment Abstract: > Studies 1 and 2 found that an intervention saving a fixed number of lives was judged significantly more beneficial when fewer lives were at risk overall. Study 3 found that respondents wanted the minimum number of lives a medical treatment would have to save to merit a fixed amount of funding to be much greater for a disease with a larger number of potential victims than for a disease with a smaller number. > Study 1: Respondents evaluated the programs in pairs, one pair per page > We predicted that preference ratings would be greater for the small-camp program than the large-camp program. Because these programs were never paired together, however, we compared respondents’ ratings for the two Rwandan programs in pairings that shared a common non-Rwandan program > Even though most respondents realized that the same number of refugees could be saved in either camp, they preferred the small-camp program (M 5 .45) over the large-camp program (M 5 2.20) when paired with either the transportation or employment programs. > Study 2 omitted dummy scenarios and had respondents evaluate Rwandan scenarios individually. > … manipulated three within-subjects variables: size of refugee camp (11,000 or 250,000), amount of pure-water aid a camp was receiving before a water-purification plane was sent (low or high), and reliability of the plane (60% or 100%). … eight different scenarios participants read… 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures factorial design. All respondents evaluated the same eight scenarios > two dependent variables: (1) the rated benefit of sending a plane, and (2) a yes/no decision on whether or not to send a plane. > A 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA on respondents’ benefit ratings provided strong support for the psychophysical numbing hypothesis (see Figure 2). A significant main effect for camp size, F (1, 132) 160.5, p .001, indicated that respondents believed sending the planes to small camps was more beneficial (M 6.46) than sending them to large camps (M 4.54). A main effect for the prior-aid variable, F (1, 132) 15.35, p .001, indicated that respondents believed sending the planes to camps that were already satisfying a substantial portion of their clean-water need was more beneficial (M 5.73) than sending them to camps that were only satisfying a small portion of their water need (M 5.27). Gertler: > Participants were less likely to allocate money to a hypothetical refugee camp when they could only save 1500 lives out of 250,000 refugees rather than 1500 lives out of 11,000. … Fetherstonhaugh et al. use the term “drop in the bucket” to describe the thought process that might bring about these decisions: saving a tiny percentage of a population could feel useless even if 1500 individuals still get the chance to live. Present small "base group" Full text
(Dellavigna ea, '12) Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving Info on recipients' deservingness
(Meier, '07) Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment. Offer a matching donation
(Smith ea, '13) Peer effects in charitable giving : evidence from the ( running ) field * Causal-observational (IV etc) Reveal previous donations Full text
(Isen & N, '79) The effect of photographs of the handicapped on donation to charity: When a thousand words may be too much Negative/positive framing
(Kellner ea, '17) Commitments to “Give if you Win” Exceed Donations After a Win Field-exp-charity Give if you win Full text
(Elfenbein ea, '12) Charity as a substitute for reputation: Evidence from an online marketplace Causal-observational (IV etc) Donations tied to purchases
(Knowles and S, '15) Transaction costs, the opportunity cost of time and procrastination in charitable giving Lab-charity Reduce transaction costs
(Landry ea, '06) Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment Field-exp-charity Offer a matching donation
(Meer, '17) Does fundraising create new giving? Natural experiment “while matches increase giving to eligible requests, they do not appear to crowd out giving to similar ones, either contemporaneously or over time.” - Matching campaigns at increases (likelihood of, amount of) funding for one project - But no significant impact on donations to other projects Consider: Context, statistical power, potential for crowding out Offer a matching donation Full text
(Karlan & L, '07) Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment Offer a matching donation
(Reinstein & R, '12) Decomposing desert and tangibility effects in a charitable giving experiment Lab-charity Tangibility
(Meyvis ea, '11) “Precommitment to Charity” in “The Science of Giving” Give more tomorrow
(Krieg & S, '17) When Charities Compete: A Laboratory Experiment with Simultaneous Public Goods Lab-noncharity Full text
(Breeze, 2013) How donors choose charities: the role of personal taste and experiences in giving decisions qualititive/interviews
(Meer, '11) Brother, can you spare a dime? Peer pressure in charitable solicitation Natural experiment Asker-donor connection, Personal ask, Solicitor characteristics, Reveal previous donations Full text
(Drouvelis & G, '16) The Effects of Induced Emotions on Pro-Social Behaviour Lab-noncharity Make people happy
(Reinstein, '10) Does One Charitable Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Causal-observational (IV etc) Reinstein 2011 BEJEAP: PSID data, some evidence of expenditure substitution, particularly for large givers, but identification (bounding below) requires particular assumptions Charities collaborate/compete?
(Adena & H, '17b) Giving Once, Giving Twice: A Two-Period Field Experiment on Narrow Framing in Charitable Giving
(Harwell ea, '15) Did the Ice Bucket Challenge Drain the Philanthropic Reservoir ?: Evidence from a Real-Donation Lab Experiment Version as of November 19 , 2015 DRAFT : DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHORS ' PERMISSION Lab-charity Charities collaborate/compete? Full text
(Benson & C, '78) Soliciting charity contributions: The parlance of asking for money Field-exp-charity Abstract: >Investigated the effects of 3 verbally mediated variables on financial contributions in a door-to-door charity campaign. The relationship of race to contributions was also observed by using both Black and White Ss. 120 Black and 120 White Ss were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 verbal appeals in a 2 (High vs Low Dependency) by 2 (Internal vs External Causal Locus of Need) by 2 (Social Responsibility vs Good Feeling as a reason for giving) factorial design. Whites contributed more than Blacks, the external locus of need condition produced more giving than the internal condition, and persons who heard the “good feeling” reason donated more than those in the “social responsibility” condition. Additionally, a significant Causal Locus of Need by Reason for Giving interaction was found. The combination of external locus of need and “good feeling” was considerably more productive of contributions than the other 3 combinations. High arousal/urgent advert
(Reinstein, '10b) Substitution Between (and Motivations for) Charitable Contributions: An Experimental Study Lab-charity Charities collaborate/compete?
(Exley, '16) Using Charity Performance Metrics as an Excuse Not to Give Avoid uncertainties/excuses
(Andrews ea, '08) The legitimization of paltry favors effect: A review and meta-analysis Meta-analysis/lit survey Ask for *small* donation Full text
(Caviola ea, '14) The evaluability bias in charitable giving: Saving administration costs or saving lives? Hypothetical/intentional experiment We describe the “evaluability bias”: the tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower administrative expenses) but not for charities with high cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two charities simultaneously—thereby enabling comparative evaluation—they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness (Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful interpretation (Study 4). Joint evaluation of a metric

Links to some key survey papers here

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  • Last modified: 2018/04/16 17:47
  • by david