Efficient Private Provision Of Public Goods By Rewarding Deviations From Average

Falkinger, Josef, (1996). Efficient Private Provision Of Public Goods By Rewarding Deviations From Average. Journal Of Public Economics, 62, 3, 413–422.

Keywords: mechanisms, public economics, public goods, theory, vcm

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This paper has been added by David Reinstein

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